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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between corruption in the Russian justice system 
and human rights violations. The hypothesis is that such corruption increases human rights 
abuses. Both law enforcement and the judiciary are included since they are equally 
important for human rights implementation. The thesis relies on international human rights 
instruments as the legal framework, focusing on civil and political rights. The link between 
corruption and human rights violations is conceptualized in a twofold manner. The first 
type of link is internal, meaning that they are conceptually linked, and that an act of 
corruption constitutes a human rights violation in and of itself. The second type of link is 
external, and causal in character, meaning that corruption causes human rights violations. 
One example of the internal links may be police officers who arbitrarily detain people as an 
act of extortion. Arbitrary detention constitutes a violation of the right to liberty and 
security of person. The causal link is demonstrated by the connection between experience 
with police corruption and distrust in the justice system. As a result of distrust ethnic 
minorities who face ethnic violence frequently abstain from filing complaints to the police. 
This means that ethnic minorities may suffer violations of non-discrimination provisions, in 
particular relating to the right to equality before the law.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement and research questions 
In this thesis I will explore corruption in the Russian justice system and its consequences 
for the realization of human rights. By “justice system” I mean the judiciary and the law 
enforcement agencies, excluding detention facilities. My hypothesis is that corruption in 
the Russian justice system increases human rights abuses.  
 
The main research questions are: (1) How is corruption manifested in the Russian judiciary 
and law enforcement agencies? (2) Do these corruption activities affect the realization of 
human rights? If so, which rights are affected? (3) How are the principles of the rule of law 
and judicial independence relevant for the realization of human rights? (4) Are the 
principles of the rule of law and judicial independence affected by corruption? 
 
Not all corruption in the justice system causes human rights violations and all human rights 
violations are definitely not caused by corruption. But certain types of corruption are 
certainly linked to human rights violations. This thesis takes a closer look at the 
relationship between the two and identifies its characteristics. I will use the word “link” on 
the relationship between corruption and human rights, independently of the character of 
this relationship. 
 
Research within the human rights field is often concerned with exploring the legal content 
of specific rights. With a focus not exclusively on the law per se but also on the 
implementation of ratified human rights instruments, I feel the urge to look behind human 
rights violations to explore why they occur. To ensure effective implementation of human 
rights there is a need to understand and acknowledge the reasons for non-compliance. 
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Particularly devastating are the effects of corruption occurring in the justice system, in 
effect nullifying the guarantee for human rights expected in a consolidated democracy. Not 
only does corruption affect the realization of rights, it also affects the basic guarantee to 
provide legal remedies for those whose convention rights are violated. That corruption has 
negative effects on the human rights situation in a country is neither a surprising nor a 
controversial statement. But the fact that little has been written specifically on the topic is 
an indication that this topic warrants investigation.  
 
I will include both the law enforcement agencies and the judicial system in my research, 
since I consider these agencies equally important from a human rights perspective. Both are 
key institutions for the implementation of human rights. The law enforcement agencies are 
vested with the power of physical ground level enforcement, while the courts provide for 
legal security. In Russia there is a general understanding that both these systems are fairly 
corrupt. According to INDEM1 in 2005 US$ 209.5 million would be spent “to obtain 
justice in law-court.”2 $368 million is spent on bribes to the traffic police alone.3 As stated 
by Holly Cartner from Human Rights Watch; “Corruption is ruining the Russian economy, 
but many people don't realize that it causes human rights abuse. To ignore these 
connections is to just miss the boat on the current crisis in Russia.”4
 
The literature that has been presented on the relationship between corruption and human 
rights is mostly concerned with corruption as an impediment to economic growth and 
efficiency and hence affecting economic and social rights.5 I will rather focus on the 
realization of civil and political rights, and the necessity of the rule of law and judicial 
independence for human rights implementation. It is also a fact that the agencies most 
concerned with human rights rarely talk about corruption, and the agencies dealing with 
corruption and anti-corruption measures are even less explicit about human rights. 
According to Nihal Jayawickrama a repressive government is more likely to be corrupt as 
                                                 
1 Informatika dlya demokrati (Information Science for Democracy), a Russian NGO 
2 INDEM (2005) 
3 Filipov, Boston Globe (31 May 2004) 
4 Corruption and Human Rights Should Top Agenda for Clinton-Yeltsin Summit (1998)  
5 See Mbonu (2004) 
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well as a human rights violator, since it lacks external checks and rejects both transparency 
and accountability. “Therefore, the campaign to contain corruption and the movement for 
the promotion and protection of human rights are not disparate processes.”6 A regime’s 
sincerity in the area of anti-corruption can give an indication of how seriously it takes its 
human rights record.  
 
Corruption is only one impediment to the realization of human rights, and there are other 
issues as important as this one. Human rights implementation may demand a wide range of 
initiatives and fighting corruption is only one of them:  
 
Corruption is not the only, or necessarily the most important, impediment to 
promoting human rights. Eradicating corruption will not in itself prompt a new 
well-spring of human rights. There are countries where human rights 
observance has increased in tandem with an increase in corruption, and 
conversely, there are countries like Singapore where corruption is very low but 
their human rights record is poor. Addressing corruption cannot be the only 
step taken to foster respect for human rights, but it can be an important one.7
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of this introductory chapter is spent on introducing the topic and its setting briefly, 
as well as explaining concepts and methodology. Chapter two introduces the human rights 
norms which make up the legal framework for my human rights analysis. In chapter three I 
introduce the principles of the rule of law and judicial independence as preconditions for 
the realization of human rights.  
 
Having set the framework for discussion I continue in chapter four by exploring 
manifestations of corruption in the Russian justice system. After introducing patterns of 
corrupt behaviour I discuss their human rights consequences. Chapter 5 is devoted to case 
studies. I present one case of petty corruption and one of grand corruption: the cases of 
                                                 
6 Jayawickrama (1998) 
7 Truelove (2003), p. 3 
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Aleksey Mikheyev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky respectively. The last chapter, chapter 6, is 
the conclusion. 
 
1.3 The link between corruption and human rights 
“Since 1998, the Strasbourg court has received more than 28, 000 human rights complaints 
from Russia, mostly concerning the abuse of power by police and judicial corruption.”8
To elucidate the link between corruption and human rights I will quote Nihal 
Jayawickrama: 
  
Many administrative decisions involving the exercise of a discretion may be 
vitiated if it can be demonstrated that the decision was influenced by a corrupt 
motive. In such event, administrative law may treat the discretion as not having 
been exercised at all, or may regard the decision as having been made for an 
improper purpose, on irrelevant considerations, or unreasonably. Where the 
decision has an impact on the exercise of a fundamental human right, the 
corrupt motive will render it arbitrary. An arbitrary arrest, arbitrary deportation, 
or arbitrary interference with privacy, will constitute a violation of the relevant 
protected right.9
 
By an act of omission the state may fail to fulfil its responsibility under international 
human rights law. The state violates human rights norms by tolerating corruption. This is 
the argument of Jarmila Lajcakova, who examines human rights violations by the Slovak 
state.10 The approach is different from the one offered by Ndiva Kofele-Kale who actually 
argues for the right to a corruption-free society.11 Kofele-Kale, supported by C. Raj 
Kumar,12 argues that either the right to a corruption-free society is a fundamental human 
right which is a component part of the right to economic self-determination and the right to 
development or it should be regarded as a freestanding autonomous right of its own.13 
Rights such as the right to a fair trial and the right to a remedy are, however, already well 
                                                 
8 Nemtsova, Newsweek International (13 March 2006) 
9 Jayawickrama (1998) 
10 Lajcakova (2003) 
11 Kofele-Kale (2000) 
12 Kumar (2002) 
13 Kofele-Kale (2000), p. 152 
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established rights within the human rights regime. These norms are also manifested in most 
domestic legislations. There is no need for recognising new rights, rather there is a need for 
the state to respect, protect and fulfil14 the rights which are already ratified. To fully 
implement human rights a state has to address the issue of judicial and law enforcement 
corruption. Arguing the emergence of new rights might seem tempting, but it is neither 
necessary nor constructive. One of the great dangers to the human rights regime is the 
watering down of the system. That could be the effect if we constantly argue the emergence 
of new rights whenever evils are identified. The rights affected by corruption already exist, 
but they cannot be properly implemented if corruption exists. 
 
One may argue that corruption may, in some cases, actually help the individual to achieve 
justice and secure human rights. One example would be a practice well known from post-
communist states; paying a bribe to speed up a case within the judicial system. Paying the 
bribe may prevent this person from having his case delayed (which ultimately could have 
led to a violation of the right to a fair trial, see chapter 2.2.5), and hence protecting the 
individual from a human rights violation. But considering that other individuals are within 
the same judicial system, waiting for their case to be heard, their case may be even more 
delayed since other pay to have their cases expedited faster. This way, the fact that one 
person pays to secure his human rights, leads to other people’s rights being violated. Those 
who do not pay may have their rights violated, but no one have their rights properly 
secured. If a person has to pay to secure his human rights, they are not adequately 
implemented. As long as some persons are able and willing to pay for their freedoms, the 
police officers are willing to continue arresting people arbitrarily.15 Therefore, the fact that 
some are willing to pay for their freedoms actually contributes to a spiral of corruption, and 
a less secure human rights situation. Another reason for concern is that corruption 
undermines democracy, “especially in regard to rule of law, political competition, and 
regime legitimacy.”16
                                                 
14 See chapter 2.1 on state obligations. 
15 On the condition that all other variables, which may influence the officers’ willingness to engage in such 
practice are left unchanged. 
16 Karklins (2005), p. 6 
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1.4 A brief introduction to the Russian Federation 
Among the post-communist states I focus on the Russian Federation. One reason is that 
Russia is the largest European state, both in terms of size and number of inhabitants.17 
Russia inherited much of what was left of the Soviet Union. It took over the international 
obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union and kept most of its territory. Russia still plays 
an important role in the region, being a member of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, and keeping close ties to other former Soviet republics. There are also large Russian 
Diasporas in many of the former republics, and pro-Russian sentiments are quite strong in 
parts of its neighboring countries like Ukraine and Belarus.18  
 
During recent years President Vladimir Putin has increased the control over the society in 
general, and has in particular imposed restrictions on the freedom of expression. Both 
media and NGOs have recently faced restrictions on their activities. The developments in 
the Russian Federation have brought about speculations over the direction the country now 
is taking and if the state is actually moving in the direction of a consolidated democracy. At 
the same time Russia experiences a decline in the level of judicial independence19 and has 
always received low scores on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index.20
 
1.5 Corruption: Difficult to define, not difficult to recognize21  
As many other concepts corruption is difficult to define. None of the international anti-
corruption instruments have a clear definition of it, hence ending up with encouraging and 
instructing the states to criminalize and combat something which is ultimately left 
undefined. Much like with international counter-terrorism documents, the anti-corruption 
                                                 
17 Although it is geographically located both in Europe and Asia, sometimes referred to as Eurasia, Russia is 
often considered European, and has joined regional organizations like the Council of Europe. 
18 This was seen played out as late as the last Presidential elections in the two states. 
19 Freedom House (2005) 
20 Russia was included in the rating in 1996, and its scores ranges between 2.1 and 2.8. See Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index 1996-2005 available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (visited 25. May 2006)  
21 Inspired by Vito Tanzi, in Miller, Grødeland, Koshechkina (2001), p. 26 
 8
conventions tend to list acts covered by the term corruption, but not including a 
comprehensive definition of it.  Among scholars there is an ongoing debate about how to 
define corruption, and there is even a debate about the debate. Michael Johnston criticizes 
that the debate about definition is actually displacing promising discussions.22 Among 
scholars the definition varies with their field of study; a social anthropologist would focus 
on how the actors themselves evaluate their acts, while legalists tend to define corruption in 
legal terms, focusing on the legality of the act itself. Economists are concerned with 
efficiency and economic development, while social scientists are guided by their interest in 
legitimate and efficient government. For my purpose I will draw on human rights law to 
define corruption. It includes acts which prevent equal treatment, equality before the law 
and in law and the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights. I will not address the 
moral aspect of human rights, leaving the discussion of the moral underpinnings of human 
rights norms to others. But human rights are moral norms expressed in legal rights of which 
I will not question the universality.  
 
Corruption manifests itself in many different forms and on different arenas. I will focus on 
corruption in the justice system that transcends the private/public boundary; a public officer 
receives a benefit (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) for doing what he is supposed to do, or for 
deviating from the formal rules of conduct. The officer is exploiting his position for private 
benefit. I will rely on the working definition used by both the World Bank and the 
Transparency International that corruption is “the abuse of public power for private 
profit.”23 Chapter 4 explores manifestations of corruption and hence serves to further 
develop the term for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
When discussing corruption it is useful to distinguish between petty corruption and grand 
corruption. The former is “corruption in the public administration, in the implementation 
end of politics”, while the latter is when “politicians and political decision-makers […], 
who are entitled to formulate, establish and implement the laws […] are themselves 
                                                 
22 Miller, Grødeland, Koshechkina (2001), p 6 
23 Andvig (2001), p. 8 
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corrupt.”24 Petty corruption is sometimes also called “low level” or “street level” 
corruption since it refers to forms of corruption that people can encounter on a daily basis 
in their interaction with public administration.25 Grand corruption, sometimes but not 
always synonymous with “high level” or political corruption, takes place at the high levels 
of the political system “when politicians and state agents […] are using this authority to 
sustain their power, status or wealth.”26 It leads to misallocation of resources and leads to 
arbitrary decision mechanisms. “Laws and regulations are abused by the rulers, side-
stepped, ignored, or even tailored to fit their interests.”27 Compared to grand corruption 
petty corruption usually involves more modest sums of money28 and is highly visible.29 
The distinction between the two types of corruption may seem clear, but in reality it is 
often blurred. “A petty corruption may be linked to a grand corruption when corruption 
flows from the top to the bottom in the government bureaucracy.”30 Junior officials may 
also pass on part of their profit to senior officials.31 In the Russian justice system, grand 
corruption is to some extent played out by lower officials, and may look just like 
manifestations of petty corruption. The acts are, however, ordered from high political 
circles with the intent of personal gain. 
 
According to Cyrille Fijnaut and Leo Huberts corruption is a crime without a recognizable 
victim since the corrupter and the corrupted both benefit from it.32 Discussing human rights 
implications of corruption, however, requires almost per definition an identification of 
victims. This thesis will identify human rights victims of corruption. 
 
                                                 
24 ibid., p. 13 
25 Corruption glossary  
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 All though this may be true regarding the sums in each corruption situation, in aggregated numbers the total 
sum spent on petty corruption constitutes large sums of money. 
29 Manandhar, eKantipur.com (26 March 2006) 
30 ibid. 
31 Section 1: The Nature of Corruption  
32 Fijnaut, Huberts (2002), p. 5 
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1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1 Choice of methodology and sources 
I will approach the issue from an inter-disciplinary angle, combining international human 
rights law with social science methodology. The thesis draws on sources from various 
academic disciplines performing a desk review.  
 
The thesis does not present any new research material but will rather rely on existing 
statistical findings and empirical data. The sources will be of both individual incidences 
represented by cases or groups of cases and comprehensive statistical findings and 
cumulative information. This means that both qualitative and quantitative data will be 
employed to investigate the hypothesis. The main focus will, however, be on individual 
cases, using them to illustrate the link between corruption and human rights violations. 
Since the intention is to explore non-compliance with human rights instruments I will not 
enter a de lege ferenda discussion regarding the international human rights regime. 
 
As mentioned above I have not conducted surveys or interviews myself, meaning that I rely 
on secondary sources for data. They consist of scholarly research and a variety of country 
reports. I also use newspaper reports of incidents of corruption. I am aware that the media 
may have their journalistic agenda,33 but because of the nature of the topic, I consider it 
necessary to rely on media for information. 
 
To illustrate the human rights implications of corruption in the justice system I will only 
focus one a selection of human rights norms. The selection is made based on the types of 
corruption discovered, and on the individual cases illustrating them. For reasons of limited 
space and for the sake of clarity, only the content of each right which is relevant to the 
cases will be presented. Other human rights may also be infringed as a result of corruption, 
                                                 
33 Sometimes a media is very politically coloured, and media is also depending on sales numbers, 
encouraging sensational stories, sometimes without being critical enough to their sources. Sometimes 
journalists or editors are receiving money or other benefits for writing a particular story. “Stories are for sales 
in most of the Russian media.” Karklins (2005), p. 37  
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but the point is to illustrate that corruption has human rights implications and that the rights 
affected represent a wide variety of human rights. Lack of trust in the justice system has 
human rights implications far beyond the realization of these few selected rights; the 
implementation of all human rights is affected. 
 
When discussing necessary precondition for human rights implementation I focus on 
judicial independence and the rule of law, as they are fundamental ingredients in 
democratic societies and reoccurring principles in the human rights discourse.  
 
Ideally I would have presented four case studies in this thesis: two from the law 
enforcement agencies and two from the judicial system, one on petty corruption and one on 
grand corruption from each sector. One reason for focusing on two cases in stead of four is 
the obvious lack of space. With this thesis I want to present facts and cases that are as 
representative as possible to the Russian reality. Hence it was a natural choice to select the 
case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky as my grand corruption case, representing government 
influence in politicized cases, and the case of Aleksey Mikheyev as the petty corruption 
case, representing the close ties between police officers creating possibilities for corruption. 
Both cases are also considered important cases; Khodorkovsky is one of the Russian 
oligarchs while Mikheyev is the first Russian to win a police torture case in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Both cases have received a fair amount of attention from 
both media and human rights organizations, generating a fairly large body of information. 
It is, however, difficult to get a truly balanced selection of sources.34 Media and NGOs are 
sometimes overly critical while public sources may be too uncritical. Therefore I also rely 
on the Council of Europe rapporteur and facts stated in the court ruling from the ECtHR. 
 
1.6.2 Measuring corruption 
As stated in a paper prepared by Valts Kalniņš on behalf of the Anti-Corruption Network 
for Transition Economies/OECD there is really no ideal method for measuring the 
                                                 
34 I did not succeed in getting a response from the Russian embassy in Oslo. 
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existence of corruption.35 As a result of the very nature of corruption, no measurement is 
able to prove a certain level of corruption, but rather one could talk about probability. 
Kalniņš presents several measurements relied upon by different agencies: perception, 
experience, beliefs and values, service and sector assessments, governance indicators, and 
associated social phenomena. All existing methods have their strengths and weaknesses. 
The best solution would therefore be to use a combination of different methods. Corruption 
is very complex and can therefore “best be approached by integrating multiple perspectives 
and methodological tools.”36 I will rely upon data collected on the basis of various 
methods; beliefs and values, experience, and perception, to be able to assess with greatest 
possible reliability the corruption in the Russian justice system. An important thing to 
remember is that once a reputation of corruption is established it takes time and effort to 
change it.37 A large amount of media attention on corruption may also create a perception 
of corruption as a large scale problem even if the government has started to tackle the 
problem with some success. 
 
The extent of corruption, meaning the number of incidents, is not my main concern, since 
human rights are individual rights, and a violation of such rights are as serious even if it 
relates to one person only. Hence, in my analysis, I will rely on two case studies that I 
believe are illustrative of my main hypothesis relating to the link between corruption and 
human rights violations. Numbers do, however, become relevant when discussing the 
implications of corruption for the rule of law. It is also relevant to know whether the cases 
of corruption, and the human rights violations, are single incidents or part of a greater 
pattern. This is not possible to fully establish in this thesis, but considering that a variety of 
sources report the same behavior it is likely that we are not only dealing with rare incidents. 
Finally, when I do refer to numbers and frequency I will do so by referring to as many 
sources as possible, reducing the likelihood of methodological problems. 
 
                                                 
35 Kalniņš (2005) 
36 Karklins (2005), p. 10 
37 Fijnaut, Huberts (2002), p. 6 
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As regards the case studies it is difficult to get a complete overview of the case. Corruption 
tends, by nature, to be hidden and difficult to prove.38 To substantiate my claims for 
corruption the discussion in chapter 5 is therefore based on circumstantial evidences. 
                                                 
38 Karklins (2005), p. 10 
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2 Applicable human rights standards 
As mentioned earlier, the Russian Federation took over international obligations 
undertaken by the Soviet Union as its successor state.39 As a result Russia is committed to 
abide by a large number of human rights instruments along with the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties which is a source of interpretation of international law. This chapter 
serves as an introduction to a selection of human rights norms ratified by the Russian 
Federation. 
 
I will first and foremost discuss civil and political rights and mainly rely on the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 2, 7, 9.1, 14, 17 and 
26, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), article 3, 5, 6, 8, 13 and 14, and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). These articles and conventions 
cover non-discrimination, prohibition of torture, the right to liberty and security of person, 
the right to privacy, the right to a fair trial and the right to a remedy. I will also introduce 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) article 2 and 13, 
Protocol 1 of the ECHR (ECHR P1) article 2 and Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) article 28, which relate to non-discrimination and the right to education. I will 
introduce the right to education separately even if the violation discussed in chapter 4.2.1.4 
is a violation of the prohibition of discrimination. The violation of the non-discrimination 
clause in ICESCR 2.2 must be read in conjunction with a covenant right, and the right to 
education includes a prohibition of discrimination. Internationally there has also been paid 
special attention to the prohibition of discrimination in education, demonstrated by the 
Convention against Discrimination in Education.40  Education is the only economic, social 
                                                 
39 Butler (2002) 
40 Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960). CESCR General Comment 13 (1999) paragraph 6 
also makes special reference to the accessibility of education, referring to the prohibition of discrimination. 
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and cultural right I found which was directly affected by corruption in the Russian justice 
system. That is not to say that others are not, just that I did not come across other explicit 
examples.41  
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the obligations undertaken by any state when 
ratifying international human rights instruments before discussing the content of the 
selected rights and principles of international human rights instruments. 
 
2.1 State obligations 
Human rights treaties are different from other international treaties since they regulate the 
relationship between the states and individuals rather than the relationship between states. 
Human rights are the rights of individuals and there need not be systemic negligence by the 
state to amount to a human rights violation. In human rights law individuals are the rights 
holders while the state is the duty bearer.42
 
According to article 2.1 the state is obliged to “respect and ensure” the rights enshrined in 
the ICCPR to “all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction […] without 
distinction”.43 Certain rights also apply extraterritorially.44 The obligation of 
implementation has immediate effect45 and the states are to give effect to the obligations in 
“good faith.”46 According to the Human Rights Committee, reservations to article 2 would 
be incompatible with the ICCPR. The legal obligation under article 2.1 is both negative and 
positive in nature. States parties must refrain from violations of rights enshrined in the 
ICCPR (respect) and must adopt “legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and other 
                                                 
41 Of course, when discussing human rights implications of public distrust in the justice system the protection 
of economic, social and cultural rights is just as affected as the protection of civil and political rights. 
42 Exceptions are certain regional instruments like the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
American Convention on Human Rights which both make reference to duties of individuals. 
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) article 2.1, a similar provision is found in the 
ECHR article 1. 
44 See CCPR General Comment 31 (2004), paragraph 12 and Soering v. The United Kingdom. 
45 CCPR General Comment 31 (2004), paragraph 5. 
46 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 26. 
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appropriate measures”47 (ensure) to fulfill their legal obligations. It also lies in the very 
nature of the ICCPR that states are obliged to prevent a recurrence of a human rights 
violation.48 Included in article 2 is also the right to a remedy for those whose Covenant 
rights have been violated. This will be further elaborated on in chapter 2.2.6. 
 
Regarding civil and political rights there rests a clear responsibility on the state for 
immediate implementation. However, in reality there is some degree of acceptance that full 
implementation may take some time. With these rights there comes both an obligation of 
conduct and an obligation of result. The situation is different when discussing state 
responsibility under the ICESCR where a state shall “take steps […] to the maximum of its 
available resources […] to achieve progressively” the Covenant rights.49 This implies that 
all rights are not expected to be fully realized at the time of ratification. Rather there rests 
an obligation of conduct on the states, to take steps to achieve full implementation in a long 
time perspective. As stated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights the 
states are obliged to move “as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards the goal.50 
The non-discrimination provisions have, however, immediate effect. 
  
According to Asbjørn Eide there rests a three-fold obligation on states to respect, protect 
and fulfil international human rights. This means that states must prohibit public officials 
from committing human rights violations, and provide effective redress for those whose 
rights have been violated (respect). The state must also prevent non-state actors from 
interfering with human rights (protect). The obligation to fulfil “requires the State to take 
the measures necessary to ensure for each person within its jurisdiction opportunities to 
obtain satisfaction of those needs, recognized in the human rights instruments, which 
cannot be secured by personal efforts.”51  
 
                                                 
47 CCPR General Comment 31 (2004), paragraph 7. 
48 ibid., paragraph 17. 
49 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), article 2. 
50 CESCR General Comment 3 (1990), paragraph 9. 
51 Eide (1987), paragraph 66-69 
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A treaty enters into force as described by the treaty itself or as set out in article 24 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. All the instruments which will be discussed in 
the following sections have been ratified by the Russian Federation and have entered into 
force. Russia has not made any relevant reservations to the documents. Therefore the 
instruments represent legal obligations of the Russian Federation. Any relevant limitation 
on a right will be discussed under each right. Finally it is important to remember that 
certain rights are derogable, and such derogations are regulated by article 4 of the ICCPR 
and article 15 of the ECHR. Considering that such derogations should be of an “exceptional 
and temporary nature,”52 which may only last as long as the life of the nation is threatened, 
the rights below will be discussed as if no such derogations have been made. 
 
2.2 Selected human rights norms 
2.2.1 Equality and non-discrimination 
The principles of equality and non-discriminations are cornerstones of human rights law 
and constantly recurring in international instruments. They entered into international law 
with the United Nation Charter53 and have extended their scope with later instruments. 
Today’s provisions vary in form; ICCPR and ICESCR express more or less general norms 
of equality and non-discrimination, some protect certain fields (like education) while some 
protect on certain grounds, like race or sex. A last group protects with regard to certain 
rights, like the right to organize.54 The principle of equality can be realized through 
different mechanisms, the prohibition of discrimination being one major approach in 
human rights law.55
 
Two non-discrimination clauses are found in the ICCPR; one free standing (article 2.1), 
applicable throughout the convention and one directly related to equality in and before the 
law (article 26). Article 2.1 is limited to convention rights, while article 26 “prohibits 
                                                 
52 CCPR General Comment 29 (2001), paragraph 2 
53 United Nations Charter (1945), article 1.3 
54 Eide (1990), pp. 17-19 
55 ibid. 
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discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities.”56 
The principle of equality of law contains three related but distinct ideas, all contained in the 
ICCPR article 26: “equality before the law”, “equal protection of the laws” and “non-
discrimination by way of law.”57
 
ICESCR article 2.2 is a similar clause to ICCPR article 2.1, guaranteeing the convention 
rights to all “without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”58 The 
ECHR also contains an open ended non-discrimination clause found in article 14, with 
application limited to convention rights.59  
 
CRC article 2.1 obliges the state parties to secure the CRC rights to “each child within their 
jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind.”60 “Disability” is added to the list of 
prohibited discrimination grounds found in ICCPR and ICESCR, and the list is related both 
to the child and its parents or legal guardians. Also a UNESCO convention protects against 
discrimination in education.61
 
The only instruments defining discrimination are International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), defining the term in 
relation to race and women respectively. These instruments list exhaustive grounds for 
discrimination, but the definitions still prove useful when interpreting other non-
discrimination clauses. The Human Rights Committee refers to CERD and CEDAW when 
interpreting the term “discrimination,” meaning it should imply  
 
                                                 
56 CCPR General Comment 18 (1989), paragraph 12 
57 Eide (1990), p. 7 
58 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), article 2.2 
59 The protection includes the law implementing the rights guaranteed, even if the laws go beyond the 
convention requirements. See Ovey, White (2002) pp. 349-350 
60 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), article 2.1 
61 Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960) 
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any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.62  
 
This does not mean identical treatment in every instance, even the conventions may require 
unequal treatment for different persons.63 The principle of equality may also require 
affirmative action to eliminate or diminish conditions which cause discrimination 
prohibited by the convention. As long as such measures are taken to correct discrimination 
in fact they constitute legitimate differentiation.64 Any criteria for differentiation must be 
reasonable and objective with the aim of achieving a purpose legitimate under the 
convention.65  
 
2.2.2 Prohibition of torture 
“No one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”66 Torture is defined in CAT as  
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him 
or a third person, or for any other reason based on discrimination of any kind 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in official 
capacity67  
 
                                                 
62 CCPR General Comment 18 (1989), paragraph 7 
63 One example is the death penalty, which cannot be carried out on pregnant women. 
64 CCPR General Comment 18 (1989), paragraph 10 
65 ibid., paragraph 13 and Ovey, White (2002) p. 350 
66 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) article 7, similar provision in article 3 of the 
ECHR, but the word “cruel” is excluded. This has little significance since the treatment will then be covered 
by “inhumane or degrading”. When I in the following chapters refer to “torture” I refer to “torture, cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.”  
67 Convention against Torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment (1984), article 
1.1 
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Freedom from torture is a non-derogable human right,68 and is ensured without any 
restrictions.69 The prohibition of torture is considered customary international law and even 
enjoys the status of jus cogens.70 It allows for no limitations.71 To be considered torture an 
act must constitute a severe intended physical or mental attack on someone’s integrity. The 
ECtHR has through its case law developed an understanding of what constitutes torture or 
inhumane or degrading treatment. It must “attain a minimum level of severity,”72 and the 
court distinguishes between torture on the one hand and inhumane or degrading treatment 
or punishment on the other – the former having a higher threshold than the latter.  
 
The Human Rights Committee makes it explicitly clear that the prohibition of torture must 
be read in conjunction with ICCPR article 2.3, which is the right to a remedy.73 This 
interpretation is confirmed by the ECtHR, which has repeatedly stated that article 3 
includes an obligation to investigate effectively any allegations or evidence of torture or 
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.74  
 
2.2.3 The right to liberty and security of person 
International law does not prohibit deprivation of liberty but provides procedural 
guarantees and minimum standards for those deprived of liberty. Article 9.1 of the ICCPR 
and article 5 of the ECHR protect individuals from arbitrary arrest and detention. 
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds 
                                                 
68 Neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR provides for derogations in times of emergency. See International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) article 4.2 and The European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) article 15.2. 
69 Nowak (2005), p. 157 
70 ibid., pp. 157-158 
71 CCPR General Comment 20 (1992), paragraph 3. See also Judgements like the case of Chahal v. United 
Kingdom where the applicant was considered to be involved in terrorist activity posing a threat to national 
security. The court still ruled that there would be a violation of article 3 to deport Chahal to India (paragraph 
161) 
72 Ireland v. United Kingdom, paragraph 162 
73 CCPR General Comment 20 (1992), paragraph 14 
74 Intervention Submission by The Redress Trust, Mikheyev v. The Russian Federation, p. 2. 
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and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”75 This provision applies 
to all deprivations of liberty, even if paragraphs 9.2 and 9.3 only apply to detention on a 
criminal charge.76 Any deprivation of liberty must be in accordance with procedure 
prescribed by law. Even when domestic law is complied with, deprivation of liberty is not 
lawful if domestic law allows for arbitrary or excessive detention.77 Cases of deprivation of 
liberty are to be considered arbitrary if they are “manifestly disproportional, unjust or 
unpredictable.”78 The manner in which an arrest is carried out must be appropriate and 
proportional according to the circumstances, and it should not be discriminatory.79 Anyone 
detained on a criminal charge has to be brought “promptly” before a judge, and anyone 
deprived of their liberty has a right to have the legality of the detention controlled.80
 
2.2.4 The right to privacy 
The right to privacy is protected in article 17 of the ICCPR and article 8 of the ECHR: “No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”81 Article 8 
protects against interferences from both the state and non-state actors such as press or 
private electronic data banks.82 As with the right to liberty and security of person, any 
interference with this right must be based in law and may, even with a firm basis in law, be 
deemed a violation if it is arbitrary.83 Searches of a person’s home should be limited to 
searching for evidence, and not amount to harassment.84  
 
                                                 
75 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) article 9.1 and The European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) article 5.1 
76 CCPR General Comment 8 (1982), paragraph 1 and Nowak pp. 220-221. See his reasoning on pp. 218-221 
77 Ovey, White (2002), p. 108. 
78 Nowak (2005), p. 225 
79 ibid., p. 225 
80 CCPR General Comment 8 (1982), paragraph 1 and 2 
81 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) article 17.1 
82 Ovey, White (2002), p. 219 
83 CCPR General Comment 16 (1988), paragraph 4  
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There is a positive obligation related to the right to privacy. The state must take some 
action to secure respect for this right, not just refrain from interfering with it. The state also 
has a duty to protect individuals from interference by other individuals.85
 
Respect for “private life”, which is the term used in ECHR article 8, includes “respect for a 
person’s moral and physical integrity, personal identity, personal information, personal 
sexuality, and personal or private space.”86 Physical and mental integrity is one of the key 
concerns of ECHR article 8, and requires the state to take positive measures to protect from 
interference.87 It is, however, doubtful whether the right to privacy, in relation to physical 
integrity, provides protection wider than that afforded under provisions on prohibition of 
torture.88
 
2.2.5 The right to a fair trial 
The right to a fair trial consists of many components presented in ICCPR article 14 and 
ECHR article 6.  
 
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination 
of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit of 
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.89  
 
The hearing can be held in camera for reasons of morals, public order, national security, 
when the interest of the private parties so requires, or when the court sees it strictly 
necessary in special circumstances to avoid prejudicing the interests of justice.90 The public 
hearings are meant to protect the individual in question, guaranteeing a fair trial, preventing 
arbitrary decisions.91 The necessity of an independent court is obvious since a biased court 
                                                 
85 Ovey, White (2002), p. 219 
86 ibid., p. 221 
87 Høstmælingen (2003), p. 218 
88 Ovey, White (2002), p. 240 
89 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), article 14.1 
90 ibid., article 14.1 
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will not serve justice. The issue of the independence of the judiciary will be discussed 
further in chapter 3.1. 
 
Paragraph 3 (of both article 14 and 6) elaborates on the requirements of a “fair hearing” 
regarding criminal charges. They are only minimum guarantees, and even observing them 
may sometimes not be enough to ensure a “fair hearing” required by paragraph 1.92 From 
the case law of the ECtHR a number of specific features have emerged which are now 
considered components of a fair trial: procedural equality, an adversarial process and 
disclosure of evidence, a reasoned decision, appearance in person, and effective 
participation.93 Another principle fundamental to the protection of human rights also 
contained in the right to a fair trial is the presumption of innocence, meaning that the 
burden of proof is on the prosecution, and guilt is not presumed until charges have been 
proved beyond reasonable doubt.94  
 
Procedural equality (often also referred to as “equality of arms”) requires a fair balance 
between the parties: “each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his 
case – including his evidence – under conditions that do not place him at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.”95 An adversarial process and disclosure of evidence 
means for instance that all relevant material is available to both parties. A reasoned 
decision is implicit in the requirements of a fair hearing. Regarding the presence and 
participation of the parties, it depends on the case whether presence is strictly necessary. It 
is clear, however, that a party should be present where an assessment of his character is 
relevant in forming the court’s opinion.96 A person is also entitled to adequate time and 
facilities to prepare for his defense. This gives the accused and the lawyer of his choice the 
                                                 
92 CCPR General Comment 13 (1984), paragraph 5 
93 Ovey, White (2002), see in general chapter 8 
94 CCPR General Comment 13 (1984), paragraph 7 
95 Ovey, White (2002), p. 156 
96 ibid., p. 159 
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right to communicate in confidentiality.97 The right to a fair trail also secures that the 
hearing must be held “within a reasonable time.”98    
 
2.2.6 The right to a remedy 
The right to a remedy is expressed in article 2.3 of the ICCPR and article 13 of the ECHR. 
The wordings of the two are very similar. “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy […].”99
 
The remedy should be accessible as well as effective and the right can be protected by 
different types of judicial and administrative procedures.100 Administrative mechanisms 
are, however, required to fulfil the obligation to investigate allegations of violations “[…] 
promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies.”101 A 
failure by the state to investigate alleged violations could give rise to a separate breach of 
the ICCPR. Whenever an investigation reveals a breach of the ICCPR the state must ensure 
that those responsible are brought to justice and that the victims be compensated. A failure 
to bring perpetrators to justice may, as with lack of proper investigation, give rise to a 
separate breach of the ICCPR. No amnesties or immunities may relieve perpetrators of 
ICCPR violations from personal responsibility, and other impediments to legal 
responsibility, such as short periods of statutory limitation, should be removed.  
 
The ECtHR decided in the Klass case that the right to a remedy is an independent provision 
which can be violated even if there is no violation of any other Convention right; it is a 
right for everyone who claims their convention rights have been violated.102 The obligation 
under article 13 depends on the nature of the complaint, but the remedy must be effective in 
                                                 
97 CCPR General Comment 13 (1984), paragraph 9 
98 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), article 
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practice and in law.103 In relation to the right to life and prohibition of torture this would 
mean a thorough and effective investigation, identifying and punishing the once 
responsible.104 Authorities must “make a serious attempt to find out what happened,”105 
and “should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as 
the basis for their decisions.”106
 
2.2.7 The right to education 
As stated in the CESCR General Comment 13, the right to education is both a human right 
in itself and a means to realize other human rights. The right to education is found in article 
13 in ICESCR, article 28 in the CRC and article 2 in protocol 1 of the ECHR. In the 
ECHR.P1 the right is defined in negative terms, while in the other instruments the right is 
expressed in a positive language: “[…] recognize the right of everyone to education”.107  
 
The state has a positive obligation to ensure compulsory and free primary education. As 
with all economic, social and cultural rights this right should be achieved progressively.108 
The education shall be available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable.109 Availability 
refers i.e. to the fact that education shall be available in sufficient quantity, while 
accessibility refers to non-discrimination, physical accessibility and economic accessibility. 
Primary education shall be free for all.110 The principle of acceptability demands for 
instance that the methods of teaching must be acceptable to students and parents, while 
adaptability refers to the need for any education to be able to adapt to changing social and 
cultural settings.111  
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If there is differential treatment in provision of education which is not based on “reasonable 
and objective”112 criteria the non-discrimination provisions become applicable.113 “[It] is 
subject to neither progressive realization nor the availability of resources; it applies fully 
and immediately to all aspects of education.”114 Prohibition of discrimination in education 
is also explicitly mentioned by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right with 
reference to the “accessibility” of education,115 and there is also a separate convention on 
the prohibition of discrimination in education.116
 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
Human rights implementation in Russia faces many challenges, only one of which is 
corruption. Human rights organizations report of deterioration of the situation the last 
years, in particular in relation to freedom of expression and erosion of democratic checks 
and balances. Another issue of great concern is the situation in Chechnya.117 In relevance 
to the following discussion on corruption in the justice system one should also note that the 
problem of police torture and violence has received attention, as has allegations of 
violations of fair trial provisions.118
 
This chapter has explained the Russian state’s responsibility to secure the realization of 
ratified human rights norms, and has introduced human rights norms which are 
compromised as a result of corruption in the Russian justice system. In reality these 
represent only a selection of the rights which are affected. As will be further elaborated in 
chapter 3 and 4, implementation of all human rights is affected as a result of erosion of the 
rule of law.  
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3 The justice system 
3.1 Preconditions for human rights implementation: the rule of law and judicial 
independence 
This chapter introduces the principles of the rule of law and judicial independence as two 
key preconditions for human rights implementation which may be distorted by corruption 
in the justice system. 
 
This connection between the rule of law and human rights is discussed by Rachel Kleinfeld 
Belton when arguing the need for developing a practical approach to the rule of law 
concept.119 The rule of law must not be understood as one unified good, but rather as 
consisting of five independent elements: government bound by law, equality before the 
law, law and order, predictable and efficient justice, and human rights implementation.120 
As we can see, human rights implementation is include as a separate good considered as a 
part of rule of law, but, as she discusses, its inclusion is contested among scholars.121 
Equality before the law is both a human right on its own, and considered a separate 
component of the rule of law. 
 
Brian Z. Tamanaha takes a different approach to the rule of law, discussing it as a 
component of liberalism. Tamanaha connects human rights, democracy and rule of law in 
his discussion on liberalism. According to him there are four themes in liberalism.122 The 
first one is the rule of law, which he also calls legal liberty. The law should apply equally 
to all, and should be foreseeable. The second theme is political liberty. In modern Western 
societies self-rule manifests itself as representative democracies. The realization of political 
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liberty requires the realization of a few political rights such as the right to vote, to stand for 
election and freedom of speech, assembly and association. The third component of 
liberalism is personal liberty. This will protect individuals from state or other interference 
with personal autonomy. This protection is often offered by civil rights contained in human 
rights instruments. The fourth and last component is what Tamanaha calls institutionalized 
preservation of liberty. This entails the effective division of government power.   
 
According to Tamanaha the relationship between the different components is sometimes 
asymmetrical. Rule of law, personal liberty and the institutional safeguards may coexist 
without political liberty.123 Hence, one can have rule of law without democracy, but there 
can be no democracy without the rule of law.124 Rule of law is also required for securing 
personal liberty.125 The rule of law is a component of a liberal society, but an illiberal 
society can also secure personal liberties as long as the rule of law prevails.  
 
Translating Tamanaha into a human rights discourse, one could think that democracy is 
unnecessary for proper human rights implementation. We need, however, to distinguish 
between human rights as manifested in the international human rights instruments and what 
Tamanaha calls personal liberties. What he calls personal liberties includes some of the 
rights we know from the international human rights instruments, but surely not all of them. 
The international instruments clearly state the right to vote, stand for election and the 
freedom of assembly, association and speech, (which are all rights Tamanaha mentions 
under political liberty) and constantly refer to “the democratic state.” Hence, human rights, 
rule of law and democracy are interdependent, and to fully implement what international 
instruments define as human rights, both a democratic state and rule of law is required. 
 
“All forms of corruption, including political, economic and corporate corruption, 
undermine democratic values and institutions, degrade the enjoyment of rights, and impair 
the ability of the State to implement human rights, in particular, economic and social 
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rights.”126 In 2002 Christy Mbonu was asked, by the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, to write a working paper on corruption and its 
impact on the realization of human rights. She was later appointed special rapporteur127 and 
her final report is still pending, but she has presented both a preliminary and a progress 
report.128 The main focus of these reports is the impact of corruption on economic, social 
and cultural rights. Mbonu does, however, include sections on the importance of integrity 
in the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies.129 She relies heavily on a paper prepared 
by Petter Langseth and Oliver Stolpe at the UN Global Centre for International Crime 
Prevention. They claim that corruption undermines important principles of the rule of law, 
without which human rights cannot be secured.130 Langseth and Stolpe refer to the right to 
due process of law, which includes the right to a fair trial and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The right is important in 
and of itself, but it is also important considering that the implementation of all other human 
rights depends upon proper administration of justice.131 When the judicial system is corrupt 
the elements of “equality of arms” and the independence and impartiality of the tribunal 
disappear.132 Decisions will be unfair and unpredictable, hence the rule of law does not 
prevail, and “fundamental precepts of human rights are violated rather than upheld.”133 
“Only where an independent judiciary exists, can judges decide cases impartially and 
justly, because “the rule of law” requires that a judge not be apprehensive of repercussions 
or retaliation form outside influences.”134
 
A corrupt judiciary also means that the legal and institutional mechanism designed to curb 
corruption are compromised. The judiciary has mandate to provide essential checks on 
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other public institutions, including law enforcement agencies, and a fair and efficient 
judiciary is the key to anti-corruption measures.135  
 
In his report the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, 
Leandro Despouy, points to the fact that corruption in the judiciary may take the form of 
biased participation in trials because of politicization of the judiciary, party loyalty or 
different types of judicial patronage. The matter is serious considering that the judiciary is 
supposed to be an impartial and reliable moral authority open to all.136 Despouy also refers 
to the case of Incal v. Turkey from the ECtHR. The court states that the judges must not 
only meet the objective criteria of impartiality, but must also be seen to be impartial.137 It is 
of fundamental importance that the people brought before the court trust the judicial system 
since “the real source of judicial power is the public acceptance of the moral authority and 
integrity of the judiciary.”138 Complete lack of trust in the judiciary and law enforcement 
agencies might lead the citizens to resort to instant justice, which in turn could result in 
anarchy.139
 
In her reports, Mbuno also maintains that the law enforcement agencies have a fundamental 
role to ensure human rights protection. She claims that corruption in these institutions 
diminishes their ability to work as human rights protectors and hinders “efficient and fair 
functioning of society.”140 “A state whose law enforcement agents are infected by corrupt 
practices lacks the necessary capacity for efficient criminal investigation, judicial 
proceedings and physical enforcement of sanctions.”141
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3.2 Structure of the law enforcement and the judiciary in Russia 
In Russia there are three judicial systems; the courts of the general jurisdiction, the 
Arbitrazh courts and the Constitutional Court. The courts of the general jurisdiction handle 
regular civil suits and criminal cases while the Arbitrazh courts handle commercial 
disputes. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of a law applied or due 
to be applied in a particular case.142 The courts of the general jurisdiction have a four-tier 
structure including military courts. The first tier comprises all general jurisdiction rayon 
(district) courts: city, inter-municipal and equal to them. The second tire includes the 
supreme courts of the republics, kray (regional), oblast (provincial) courts, city courts of 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, courts of autonomous provinces and autonomous districts, 
while the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is the supreme judicial body for all 
courts of general jurisdiction, both civil and military. The Russian Constitution of 1993 
guarantees, as the first Russian constitution, judicial independence and separation of 
power.143
 
The Russian law enforcement agencies performing day-to-day functions belong to the 
Ministry of Interior (MVD). The police (militsiia) within the MVD are to ensure the 
personal safety of citizens, prevent and suppress crimes, uncover crimes, protect pubic 
order and ensure public safety, and render assistance to citizens, enterprises and 
organizations according to their rights.144 The police is divided into “criminal police” and 
“public security police.” 
 
3.3 Public sentiments towards the justice system in Russia 
The Russian public opinion of the justice system is quite negative and one reporter 
expressed it like this: “We relate to the cops not as citizens to the defenders of law and 
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order, but as inmates to prison guards. We just hope they’ll leave us alone”.145 Numerous 
sources reach the same conclusion: Russians lack trust in the law enforcement and the 
judiciary – the human rights implementation bodies. According to a nation wide survey by 
Levada Centre 71% of the respondents do not trust the police at all, and only 2% think the 
police acts within the law. 41 % live in fear of police violence. The Russian human rights 
Ombudsman says the problem is so deep that it will take years to correct.146 80% think 
nothing can protect them from police abuse,147 and 60% say extortion and racketeering are 
as integral parts of the police activity as patrolling the streets.148 83% regard the police to 
be corrupt, while 79% assume the courts and prosecutor’s offices are corrupt.149 Corruption 
pervades Russian law enforcement, from the bottom to the top of the system. The judiciary 
is under similar pressure, eroding the rule of law.150
 
Research by Mendelson and Gerber produces similar findings: only 3% say the police 
“fully” deserve trust, while 23% say they “probably” deserve trust. 65% say that the police 
“probably not” (36%) or “not at all” (29%) deserve trust.151 Half the respondents say they 
live in fear of physical abuse by the police, and the number rises to 61% among males 
under 40. Trust in the courts is slightly higher than trust in the police: 34% trust them to 
some degree, while 49% do not. Only 4% feel certain they will be treated according to law 
if arrested, while about two-thirds say they will “probably” or “definitely” not. Here too, 
younger males are more sceptical than the average population: 76% say they do not think 
they will be treated according to law if arrested. Only 29% think it is unlikely that they can 
be convicted for a crime they did not commit. 
 
Surveys of public opinion show a stable level of distrust to the law enforcement agencies, 
which is manifested in the fact that victims of crimes refuse to seek protection from the law 
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enforcement agencies.152 According to Transparency International’s report “The Russian 
Federation – Denial of Justice” discrimination and ethnically motivated violence occurs. 
Often these attacks are not reported to the police because the victims have a justified fear 
that they will experience harassment and extortion from the police if they choose to report 
the incidents.153  
 
As one might expect, experience with police misconduct correlates with low confidence in 
the police and increases concern about police corruption. More surprisingly, it also 
correlates with low confidence in the courts.154 All types of experience with police abuse 
increases fear of police violence and decreases the confidence of fair treatment if 
arrested.155 The impact of experience on perception was controlled for the effects of age, 
sex, ethnicity, education, social status and place of residence. From the results it is clear 
that police corruption undermines public trust in the whole justice system. The lack of 
human rights observance of the law enforcement agencies fosters growing distrust of the 
population, which in turn impedes the law enforcement activities, damaging the state power 
at large.156  
 
The fact that experience is a major factor contributing to perception could also mean that 
the public trust in the legal system can be improved if people experience fair and efficient 
public institutions. Some of the respondents in the survey by Mendelson and Gerber also 
stated a will to trust the police considering the vital role it could play in protecting public 
safety.157  
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3.4 Concluding remarks 
Rule of law and judicial independence are fundamental pillars in any democratic state and 
necessary preconditions for the implementation of human rights law. International human 
rights standards also include rights which specifically require judicial independence and 
equality before and in law. The rule of law and judicial independence are affected by low 
public confidence in courts and law enforcement structures. Russians show a stable level of 
distrust to its courts and police, which is partially caused by corruption in the justice 
system. 
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4 Corruption in the Russian Federation 
This chapter examines one of the reasons for low confidence in the Russian police and 
judiciary which is corruption in the justice system. The chapter documents its presence and 
discusses it as one obstacle to human rights implementation. 
 
4.1 Presence of corruption in the Russian Federation 
Recognizing the particularities of each country it is still useful and possible to make some 
generalizations of the post-Soviet states because of their common heritage. They all 
experienced the homogenizing effect of a single body of law, and identical administrative 
structures based on a common ideological background.158 According to Karklins they were 
ruled by a few communist party elites who had exceptional powers and were above the law. 
The political influence of ruling elites on law enforcement still persist. 159 Also, “[…] post-
communist regimes tended to have a special relationship between formal and informal 
institutions, with the latter often being decisive.”160 Citizens managed to live normal lives 
partly because they learned how to be “artful dodgers,” constantly looking for loopholes or 
relying on informal networks.161  
 
One way to operate as such “artful dodgers” is through blat. This involves giving gifts and 
mutual assistance, but unlike bribes, the relationship between the people involved is not 
only defined by the blat itself. The relationship is of a long term character, and the blat does 
not require immediate return of the favor.162 Even though most Russians accept that blat is 
happening everywhere in society, they are still hesitant to call their own acts blat. They 
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rather use words like “helping out” or “mutual care” when describing personal 
involvement, leaving the word blat for describing acts of others.163 Ledeneva maintains that 
blat differs from other forms of informal exchange, stressing that blat is an exchange of 
“favors of access” reorganizing the official distribution of goods.164 Ledeneva claims that 
when a person is involved in blat, even when using her position, the act is done not for the 
benefit of himself, but for the benefit of someone else, and therefore it is not corruption. 
Blat is occurring between regular citizens, not necessarily crossing the public/private 
boundary.165  
 
Blat means relying on informal networks to achieve certain benefits which otherwise may 
be out of reach. Even if blat means relying on a network where the altruistic motive behind 
any act is dominant,166 there are other types of informal networks where the motive behind 
the “mutual care” definitely is selfish. Normally informal networks consist of people from 
different sectors of society and with different backgrounds who are friends, family, 
neighbors or colleagues. Grødeland’s definition of an informal network is “an informal 
circle of people able to and willing to help each other.”167 People within such informal 
networks derive some benefits from belonging to them, and hence have an interest in 
maintaining them. They may also feel an obligation towards other people within the same 
network, and a failure to comply with the norms within the network may lead to 
estrangement from the network altogether.168 These informal networks seem to play a role 
within police departments, creating informal networks of police officers who are exploiting 
their powers for the benefit of colleagues, and, ultimately, themselves.  
 
Public sentiment towards corruption is somewhat contradictory. Among the regular citizens 
many see corruption mainly an elite problem, believing that politicians do little to fight it 
because they are themselves part of it. Bribes which resolve a problem are considered 
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normal, and helping a friend is considered almost as a social responsibility.169 Both 
Karklins and Marina Kurkchiyan believe some of this culture also stems from an 
assumption common among citizens in post-Soviet states that everybody else breaks the 
law and hence they have to do the same – even if they would rather live among law-abiding 
people.170 Often people even act against their own values. People express negative 
expectations about the justice system, but wish things were different. Normative values 
about the rule of law are not significantly different from those in the Western Europe,171 
but what Kurkchiyan calls the negative myth of the rule of law sustains even when positive 
examples occur. I.e. court decisions where both parties agree there was no corruption 
involved are still interpreted in a cynical way consistent with the assumption that judicial 
decisions are made on the basis of private interests.172 As a result, Russia has one of the 
worst records of legal behaviour in the world.173  
 
In 2006 the INDEM Foundation will release a comprehensive report “Diagnostics of the 
corruption in Russia: 2001-2005” on the level, structure and trends of corruption.174 The 
preliminary report gives an indication of the current situation in Russia. Russians spend 
US$ 3 billion on bribes every year.175 This only estimates the total sum of money spent on 
bribes.176 The trend seems to be that the risk of corruption, meaning the authorities’ 
corruption pressure on citizens, has increased, while people’s readiness to bribe is reduced. 
The number of average annual bribes for each briber has declined, while the average 
amount spent on each bribe has increased. In 2005 54.9 % of the respondents state that they 
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have been involved in a corrupt activity (irrespective of the outcome), while the number 
was 50.4 % in 2001.177
 
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in the Russian Federation. All aspects of every 
day life are affected, and the consequences are serious. Corruption occurs in almost all 
sectors of public life, affecting individuals’ access to public goods such as education and 
health care. It is also common to deliberately have contradictory rules so that business 
cannot avoid breaking one or the other, creating opportunities for corruption. Karklins 
gives the example of how police authorities require all jewellery stores to have bars on their 
windows while fire inspectors state that no windows can be barred.178 In the 2004 Beslan 
school attack the terrorists paid bribes to bring trucks into the school compound.179 Also 
the downing of two airplanes in August 2004 and the theatre hostage situation in 2002 was 
facilitated by corruption in the law enforcement agencies.180 Corruption also facilitates and 
protects the operation of criminal trafficking networks in Russia.181 The TI Index 2005 
shows that Russia scored lower than the year before, now scoring a low 2.4. This is the 
same as Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Albania.182
 
4.2 Corruption in the Russian justice system 
The following sections present manifestations of corruption in the Russian justice system. 
The overview is not a comprehensive diagnostic of types of corruption, but is rather meant 
as a tool to systematically assess human rights implications of corruption in the justice 
system, and as a framework for the case analysis in the following chapter. The police and 
courts are dealt with separately in chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 and the sections are divided on 
the basis of different acts which may be manifestations of one or several types of 
corruption.  
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The following tables express how different unlawful acts are related to corruption, and how 
these acts of corruption are linked to human rights violations. Table 4.1 relates to the law 
enforcement while table 4.2 relates to the judiciary. As will be further discussed in chapter 
4.3 the corruption in the Russian justice system and human rights violations are either 
conceptually or causally linked. This means that the link between the two is either internal 
or external in character. An internal link means that the corrupt behavior constitutes a 
human rights violation in itself, while an external link means that corruption causes human 
rights violations. 
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Unlawful police activity: Relevance to corruption: Link to human rights: 
detention/interference 
with privacy 
extortion 
sell services 
internal: 
right to liberty and security of 
person 
right to privacy 
 
external: 
erodes trust in the justice system
intimidation 
 
 
 
 
 
sell services 
network activity 
extortion 
 
internal: 
right to liberty and security of 
person 
prohibition of torture 
right to privacy 
 
external: 
prohibition of torture 
erodes trust in the justice system
improper investigation/ 
manipulation of evidence 
 
 
network activity 
 
internal: 
right to a remedy 
 
external: 
prohibition of torture 
erodes trust in the justice system
demand/accept money bribe 
 
external: 
prohibition of discrimination in 
relation to the right to 
education, equality in/before the 
law  
erodes trust in the justice system
Figure 4.1. The table shows of how unlawful police acts are related to corruption, and how this is linked to 
human rights violations. 
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Unlawful acts in the 
Judiciary: 
Relevance to corruption: Link to human rights: 
change charges/release from 
detention 
Bribe/intimidation internal: 
relevant convention right 
 
external: 
erodes the rule of law 
selective application of the 
law/biased ruling 
bribe/intimidation internal: 
right to a fair trial 
equality before the law 
 
external:
erodes the rule of law 
Figure 4.2 The table shows how unlawful acts in the judiciary are related to corruption, and linked to human 
rights violations. 
 
 
Within the Russian justice system both petty corruption and grand corruption exist. It may 
be difficult to distinguish between the two since they manifest themselves in similar 
patterns. To successfully combat corruption it is necessary to clearly distinguish between 
the two, but for the purpose of this thesis it is not necessary at all times to determine 
between them when discussing different manifestations of corruption. Suffice to say they 
both exist within the justice system, and that most manifestations of corruption presented in 
this chapter may be manifestations of petty or grand corruption, depending on who initiates 
the acts and who benefits from them. 
 
4.2.1 Corruption in Russian law enforcement 
Demanding bribes for minor infractions is perhaps the most common form of corruption in 
the police,183 but corruption does not only take the form of voluntary offerings of bribes. 
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Regularly, the corrupt activity is initiated by police officers, who sometimes use physical or 
verbal threats to extract money or to influence individuals’ behavior in relation to a case 
under investigation or hearing. The police might also be under influence of powerful 
individuals, criminal networks and the executive branch of government.184
  
Police officers who abuse their power to extort and exploit citizens instead of protecting 
them are called “werewolves in uniform.”185 The practice of abuse seems to be extensive 
and even increasing, and with few crackdowns. 186 Police officers are considered to do 
more public harm than public good, and 52% of Russians think that the police put both 
their own and elite interests over public order.187 Voluntary offering of bribes is, however, 
also a common practice, especially in the traffic police. 
 
The motivations for police officers to engage in corruption are many. One possible reason 
is that police effectiveness is measured by number of crimes solved.188 Also, the principle 
of the presumption of innocence has a relatively weak position in Russia.189 Many police 
officers consider human rights violations acceptable for the purpose of apprehending and 
punishing criminals.190 According to Human Rights Watch some even say that they think it 
is impossible to solve crimes without sometimes resorting to torture.191 These factors all 
contribute to a tolerance among police officers of resorting to illegal measures, like torture, 
to solve crimes. Officially, evidence obtained in violation of the requirements of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure is inadmissible, but judges rarely exclude such confessions.192 At 
least one-third of all convictions are based on evidence obtained using violence.193 To 
avoid criminal charges police officers protect each other by relying on informal networks 
existing between police officers, and engaging in corrupt practices like intimidating 
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witnesses and otherwise obstructing justice. This is facilitated by the close relationship 
between the officers who are under investigation and those who investigate the cases of 
alleged torture or violence. Since evidence obtained through illegal measures is not 
dismissed, and since the officers protect each other, the circle of abuse continues. Another 
reason for corruption is that because of their low salaries, law enforcement personnel start 
looking for other possible sources of income.194 The Public Verdict Foundation also 
blames the officers’ low professionalism for their human rights violations.195  
 
An officer’s income consists of two parts: one fixed part set by the work schedule, and one 
part consisting of a variety of supplementary payments.196 These supplementary payments 
amount to 30%-60% of the monthly income. An officer’s superior decides whether or not 
he will be paid extra in any given month. This means that an officer’s income depends on 
whether or not he is favored by his superior, meaning that he will do whatever it takes to 
please him. Officers tend to obey orders without scrutiny, even when human rights are 
violated. Each police officer has a record of all violations (for which he may be dismissed 
or even prosecuted) he has committed. This list is used whenever the officer has fallen out 
of favor. Obeying the orders of his superior the officer hopes his violations are overlooked 
by the superior. This pattern means a constant reproduction of human rights violations.197 
This means that the networks within the police may consist of persons with unequal 
bargaining power, and may be a relationship defined by dependence. 
 
According to the Public Verdict Foundation one of the most serious problems in the 
Russian law enforcement system is the ineffective system of management which stimulates 
corruption and facilitates replication of human rights violations.198 In the research project 
“Arbitrariness in Law enforcement: Roots and Practices” the Demos Center used case 
studies to identify typical situations where law enforcement officers violate human rights. 
The first situation is where violations are committed “in the interest of the service.” The 
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second situation is where commercial or political structures use law enforcement agencies 
to suppress their competitors or political opponents. A third situation is when law 
enforcement officers protect the interests of their colleagues. The last situation identified is 
when the officers use their authority for personal benefit or to solve problems of friends 
and family.199 Three out of these four types of situations are typical corruption situations: 
officers use their position to the benefit of themselves, friends, relatives, colleagues, or 
criminal or political interests. 
 
“Political or commercial influence” 
 
• arbitrary detention/interference with 
privacy 
• intimidation 
“In the interest of the service” 
 
i.e. torture for confessions or threaten 
people 
 
 
 
“Helping himself, friends or family” 
 
• arbitrary detention/interference with 
privacy 
• improper investigation 
• intimidation 
• demand/accept bribes 
 
 
“Protecting colleagues” 
 
• arbitrary detention/interference with 
privacy 
• improper investigation 
• intimidation 
• demand/accept bribes 
Figure 4.3. Illustration of the four situations where police officers commit human rights violations. The 
arrows illustrate how one act (which may be a human rights violation like torture), which may be done “in the 
interest in the service”, may lead to corrupt activity like improper investigation or intimidation to help himself 
(left box) or colleagues (right box). See (Situation in the Russian law-enforcement system and its influence on 
human rights observance 2005) 
  
4.2.1.1 Arbitrary detention/interference with privacy 
Arbitrary detention or arbitrary search of property can be examples of extortion. Police 
officers may stop people on the streets, search their homes or detain them. These situations 
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are likely to end up with extortion or bribes.200 Another form of corruption in the law 
enforcement agencies is when the public officers sell their “services” to anyone willing to 
pay. According to the Boston Globe, the Russian magazine “Mergers and Acquisitions” 
published a price list of “services” for sale by the police and prosecutors,201 one of which is 
seizing offices and interfering with individuals’ privacy. The “services” are primarily 
meant for business men who are willing to pay between $10 000 and $50 000 to harm their 
competitor, but the average citizens also have access to them. In the survey of Mendelson 
and Gerber a woman told that the police once refused to protect her family from someone 
who was harassing them because this person had paid a bribe.202
 
Sometimes the practice of arbitrary detention is combined with different forms of 
intimidation, like threats of criminal charges. This happened to Mr. Magsumov and Mr. 
Nizamutdinov who were detained in 2003. Two police officers planted illicit drugs on them 
and demanded 100 000 rubles to drop the charges.203
 
4.2.1.2 Intimidation 
Intimidation is used for several purposes, as a way of generating money, either through 
direct extortion or through selling a service (intimidating a third party), or as a means to 
achieve other goals, such as stopping further investigation into allegations of police 
misconduct.204 Intimidation is here divided into two practices: detention and threats of 
criminal prosecution, and violence or threats of violence. 
 
4.2.1.2.1 Detention and threats of criminal prosecution 
Sometimes police officers use detention or threats of criminal prosecution as leverage to 
extort money. An example of this practice was revealed when seven police officers were 
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arrested in 2003. They were charged for extorting $500 000 from business men, and 
trumping up charges against those who refused to pay.205 The police frequently intimidate 
or threaten people with prosecution if they do not pay the amount asked for.206 Sometimes 
police officers plant evidence to substantiate their threats. This “service” is also possible to 
buy. Planting drugs on someone before making an arrest was listed as one possible 
“service” which was open for sale. It is also possible to pay to have a case opened or closed 
for further investigation.207
 
A Russian human rights group in Kazan has faced numerous checks of their finances and 
their employees have been threatened with imprisonment after the group persuaded the 
prosecutor to investigate 11 cases of police misconduct.208
 
4.2.1.2.2 Violence 
Police officers go to great lengths to silence whistle-blowers, especially to avoid 
complaints at the ECtHR.209 Last year a man was threatened to write to the Prosecutor 
General in Moscow and request him to close a case filed to the ECtHR. The case concerned 
the disappearance of this mans brother while he was in the hands of the Russian armed 
forces. The man was told that if he did not do as requested they could arrange his 
disappearance too.210 The organization Redress reports of several instances where 
individuals who had launched a complaint for torture against law enforcement personnel 
were bribed or intimidated into withdrawing their complaints.211 Suspects of police torture 
and their colleagues threaten and harass both plaintiffs, witnesses, lawyers and human 
rights defenders for pursuing a case against them.212
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A young man, German Gladesky, who initiated inquires into police brutality was shot 
during a meeting with two unidentified men. The police say he was attacked by robbers, 
others say it was the werewolves of Moscow.213 According to a lawyer for the European 
Human Rights Advocacy Center at least 5 petitioners to the ECtHR have been killed since 
2001. In addition, dozens have been kidnapped, beaten or tortured by the police.214
 
4.2.1.3 Improper investigation/manipulation of evidence 
Police officers are reluctant to help investigate colleagues who face allegations of 
misconduct, particularly when it comes to torture. Several reports address cover-ups and 
manipulation of evidence.215 In some cases, police officers accused of torture or their 
colleagues, have destroyed or tampered with incriminating evidence.216 The investigation 
of torture allegations against police officers is often very limited. Sometimes they are 
closed without even questioning the victim or without providing proper medical 
examination.217
 
4.2.1.4 Demand bribes to perform police duty 
The Police also frequently demand bribes for doing the job they are supposed to do. One 
example of such practice is the process of registration at local police precincts. Every 
citizen must register at the police within seven days after moving to a new place of 
residence. The police frequently demands bribes for processing such registration 
applications.218 A study from the late 1990s reports that Russian police officers receiving 
bribes were part of an organized scheme passing a part of the bribes up the law 
enforcement hierarchy.219
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4.2.1.5 Accept bribes to perform acts outside their duty 
A typical example of voluntary offering of bribes would be bribing the traffic police. As 
stated in the introductory chapter, in 2001 $368 million was spent on bribes to the Russian 
traffic police. The officers frequently accept bribes, which amount to a little less than the 
regular ticket, or a higher bribe to drop charges for more serious offences. One example is 
the wife of lawyer Sergei S, who was drunk and was stopped by the police. She avoided 
arrest by paying the officer $300.220
 
4.2.2 Corruption in the Russian judiciary 
One may think that if the number of persons prosecuted is low, it indicates a low level of 
corruption. On the contrary, the opposite is likely to be true. Few prosecutions can indicate 
a very high level of corruption, including judicial corruption. According to Karklins, this 
seems to be the case in Russia.221 Louise Shelly also talks about “massive pay-offs to the 
police, procuracy, and judiciary” indicating a high level of corruption in the Russian justice 
system.222
 
According to Langseth and Stolpe indications of judicial corruption include:  
 
delay in the execution of court orders; unjustifiable issuance of summons and 
granting of bails; prisoners not being brought to court; lack of public access to 
records of court proceedings; disappearance of files; unusual variations in 
sentencing; delays in delivery of judgements; high acquittal rates; conflict of 
interest; prejudices for or against a party witness, or lawyer (individually or as 
member of a particular group); prolonged service in a particular judicial station; 
high rates of decisions in favour of the executive; appointments perceived as 
resulting from political patronage; preferential or hostile treatment by the 
executive or legislature; frequent socialising with particular members of the 
legal profession, executive or legislature (with litigants or potential litigants); 
and postretirement placements.223
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In 2005 an estimated $209.5 million was spent to “win justice in court”.224 This statistic 
does not distinguish between arbitration courts and general courts. The Government or the 
Parliament influence court decisions in high profile cases (politicized cases). The Supreme 
Court also frequently overturns “not guilty” rulings by juries. In a survey on the arbitration 
courts, 66% of the respondents believed that the arbitration judges were regularly under 
pressure from local and regional officials.225 The Russian general courts are less affected 
by corruption. Still, the numbers from the arbitration courts are interesting since they 
confirm that government officials are able and willing to interfere in a court of law. There 
is little reason to believe that such interference does not occur in the general courts as long 
as they have an interest in doing so. It is difficult to estimate the scale of corruption in the 
Russian judiciary. Lawyers who bribe tend to think that all judges are corrupt, while those 
who do not estimate that the number is between two and five percent. Even if the number is 
as low as two percent, it still means that 400 corrupt judges work in the Russian 
judiciary.226 A bribe is not given directly to the judge, but rather paid for instance to a legal 
firm where one of the judge’s relatives works. The bribe is disguised as a contract or a 
fee.227
 
The cases of concern in the general courts are mostly high-profile cases affecting the 
interest of major criminal groups or politicians.228 The performance of the general 
jurisdiction courts shows that judges do have the discretion to rule against the state. On 
average 80% of the cases where citizens complained against officials the citizens 
succeeded in their law suits.229 But most of these cases were not high-profile cases, and 
they did not matter to politicians or their friends.230 The statistics do not show what kinds 
of complaints were made and which institutions the officials represented. Hence there 
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might be big differences in the success rate between different agencies. There are also quite 
large geographical differences.231  
 
Surveys conducted in post-communist states suggest that contacts and informal networks 
are used to get information, advice or to speed up a procedure.232 Respondents in all 
countries said they would comply with requests that were within the limits of the law – like 
speeding up procedures.233 Even if Russia is not one of the countries included in the survey 
by Grødeland, it is still likely that the findings are representative of Russia too. There, as in 
most other post-communist states, the impact of judicial reform has been limited due to a 
number of reasons: lack of funding, insufficient legal training resulting in shortage of 
qualified staff, and a legal “chaos” created by amended old laws and new laws making it 
difficult for anyone within the system to stay up to date. All these factors make the 
judiciary vulnerable to external influence.234 Similar situations for the judiciary in the 
aftermath of communism are combined with common experiences during communism. The 
judiciary was mainly serving a political purpose where the judge should rule according to 
the prosecutor’s demand. 
 
The Freedom House rating of Russia on judicial framework and independence dropped 
from 4.75 to 5.25 in the 2005 report. Even if the law provides for judicial independence, 
judges are frequently influenced by governmental authorities, wealthy individuals and 
business enterprises.235 The Freedom House report also explains how the executive branch 
can exert pressure on courts through chief judges. They are appointed for six years and 
reappointment depends on a review by the presidential administration. The chief judges 
often decides which judges will hear sensitive cases and often assign them to “reliable” 
judges who will make the appropriate decision.236 These chief judges, or chairs, hence 
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become the point of entry for anyone who wants to influence the outcome of a particular 
case. In return of making an illegitimate decision a judge may also be promised quick 
access to benefits like housing, to which he is entitled anyway.237 The chairs handle the 
delivery of perks, and they are able to influence the promotion of judges through positive 
evaluations. They also decide when to give unofficial warnings or invoke a formal process 
of review of the judges.238 The ground for disciplinary proceedings can be as broadly 
defined as producing red-tape, labour discipline infractions and violation of the norms of 
material and procedural legislation.239 The punishment for opposing these informal rules 
can be transfer to another district or even dismissal. Sergei Pashin and Olga Kudeshkina are 
two victims of this practice, who both lost their jobs as judges at the Moscow City Court 
because they refused to obey informal orders from the executive branch of government. 
“The chief judge of the Moscow court put a lot of pressure on me to rule the way she 
wanted. Even in Soviet times pressure like that did not exist.”240 In general, judges face 
pressure from their superiors, who are appointed by presidential decree.241 In Russian 
general courts the conviction rate is 99 percent, which is extremely high.242 One reason is 
that judges fear they will be dismissed or forced to resign if they do not convict the number 
expected by the prosecutors. Prosecutors also abuse the judicial system by bringing cases 
under falsified charges to target outspoken regime critics, sometimes in collaboration with 
the FSB.243 Because of lack of sufficient funding of the courts the majority rely on 
supplementary payments or allocations provided by local or regional governments.244
 
As for influence from powerful individuals or criminal networks, the judges may accept the 
bribe voluntarily or as a result of intimidation. The intimidation may take form of physical 
threats against the judge and his family or forcing him to take the bribe so that he can be 
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blackmailed in the future.245 The authorities do not provide adequate protection from 
intimidation or threats from powerful criminal defendants.246
 
Assizors may also be enticed by benefits or money. In December 2005 Ernst Cherniy, the 
Responsible Secretary of the Nongovernmental Committee for Protection of Scientists, 
gave a speech at the conference “Politically Motivated Legal Cases In Present Day 
Russia”.247 He gave an example of how jury members are pressured by the special services 
to vote in favour of a guilty verdict for Valentin Danilov. Cherniy claims that 8 out of the 
12 assizors experienced pressure. One assizor, Suvorov, was, at the time of the hearing of 
the Danilov case, under criminal investigation. He was persuaded by a Federal Security 
Service (FSB) representative; if he voted “the right way” the criminal persecution would 
stop. Cherniy also implies that the assizors on this particular case were carefully 
selected.248
 
4.2.2.1 Change charges or release from detention 
Corrupt judges can be bribed to release someone from custody, to change the qualification 
of the crime, or to release the person from criminal responsibility all together. One official 
tried for fraud paid $300 000 and the official crime he was tried for was changed to 
negligence.249 The sentence he got was already served in the detention centre. In 2001, the 
Novgorod City Judge Svetlana Tuzikova released the leader of a criminal group, Aleksandr 
Artyushchik, from custody. He was accused of banditry and attempted murder, but the 
judge released him because of his heightened blood pressure. How much he paid is still 
unknown, but Tuzikova was dismissed for her intentional violation of the law.250
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4.2.2.2 Selective application of the law/biased ruling 
Government influence can sway decisions or it can lead to selective application of the law. 
Several, like Gregory Yavlinsky, the leader of the opposition party Yabloko, claim that the 
law is applied selectively in favour of government interest.251 According to several human 
rights organizations and the US State Department the arrest and detention of the oligarch 
Khodorkovsky is only one example of such practice.252 Another example may be Mikhail 
Mirilashvili, a prominent Russian-Israeli business man who was sentenced in 2003 to 12 
years in jail on charges of kidnapping and attempted murder. This case, like the case of 
Khodorkovsky, is denounced as a politically motivated trial.253 A third example would be 
the case of Mikhail Trepashkin, who came across circumstantial evidence of FSB 
involvement in the 1999 Moscow apartment house bombings.254 Mirilashvili’s lawyer, 
Aleksandr Afanassiev, believes that judicial corruption is what leads many Russians to take 
their cases to the ECtHR.255 Mirilashvili, Trepashkin and Khodorkovsky have all three 
appealed to the ECtHR256 The case of Trepashkin has been declared admissible.257  
 
4.3 Human rights implications of corruption in the Russian justice system 
As shown by figure 4.1 and 4.2 different types of acts, which may be corruption related, 
have different types of human rights implications. It seems that there are two types of links 
between acts of corruption (and hence corruption) and human rights violations: they can be 
internally or externally linked. 
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4.3.1 Internal links 
That corruption and human rights violations are internally linked means that an act or 
corruption and human rights violations are conceptually linked. This means that the corrupt 
behaviour constitutes a human rights violation in and of itself. Examples would be the 
practice of arbitrarily stopping people on the streets or searching their homes. Such acts 
constitute, as explained in chapter 2.2.4 and 2.2.3, a violation of the right to privacy, or the 
right to liberty and security of person. When interference ends with the police asking for 
bribes or an extortion situation, or the situation is otherwise a manifestation of corruption, 
the corrupt practice creates situations of human rights violations. To threaten individuals 
with criminal prosecution (i.e. based on planted evidence) is not a human rights violation 
until the threat becomes reality and the prosecution begins and the individual is detained on 
criminal charges. Any detention based on planted or constructed evidence means illegal 
detention, which would violate the right to liberty and security of person.258  
 
Police officers arbitrarily killing individuals are violating the individual’s right to life, 
while enforced disappearances may constitute a violation of the same right.259 Torturing 
individuals to influence an individual’s behavior is a violation of the prohibition of 
torture,260 and violence by police officers not reaching the threshold of torture is often 
covered by the same human rights provision under the term “cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment.” Improper investigation into allegations of violations of the ICCPR or the ECHR 
constitutes a violation of the right to a remedy and may also be considered a violation of 
the relevant human right.261
 
Bribes in the traffic police seems a widespread practice, and in the particular example 
mentioned in section 4.2.1.5 there is no victim of a human rights violation. Hypothetically 
though, there could have been one, had the drunk driver for instance been responsible for a 
lethal accident and bribed his/her way out of charges. Such corruption would violate the 
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right to life. This is important to keep in mind, even if no such explicit examples are sited. 
Even seemingly innocent corruption in the traffic police may have human rights 
consequences. 
 
In courts the judge or assizors may rule biased or arbitrarily release individuals from 
custody. If the ruling is bought the corruption constitutes a violation of the right to a fair 
trial, considering that the hearing is neither fair nor impartial. Corruption in the courts may 
also involve giving privileged access to information or creating obstacles for client-lawyer 
interaction. Both could constitute violations of fair trial provisions.262 Where criminals who 
influence decisions have committed a violation of a right protected by human rights law, 
the corruption would also constitute a violation of the relevant right and may also constitute 
a violation of the right to a remedy. 
 
4.3.2 External links 
The second type of link between corruption and human rights is external. This means that 
there is a causal effect of corruption on human rights violations. One example is the police 
officers’ practice of demanding money to process registration applications which is 
causally linked to infringements of children’s right to primary education. Federal law 
provides education for all children, but regional authorities often deny access to schools for 
children of unregistered persons.263 The violation would be a violation of non-
discrimination provisions in relation to the right to education since all rights should be 
provided to everybody, without discrimination. “No person or group has a right to 
privileged treatment. Conversely, every citizen is entitled to equality of treatment from 
public officials in the exercise of their powers, duties and functions.”264 In this case, 
children whose parents are not registered are discriminated against.265 This type of practice 
would also violate the non-discrimination provision relating to equal protection of the law, 
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since this provision provides for protection against discrimination in the practice of the 
laws.266
 
As mentioned earlier, police officers go to great lengths to cover up each other’s 
misconduct. It also seems that the relationship between the regular police officers and their 
superiors is defined by dependency. One might say that the police officers form an informal 
network, where they are required to follow a set of informal rules. This means that 
investigation into police misconduct often is not properly conducted, which stimulates an 
environment of replication of the misconduct. In particular, this relates to investigation into 
allegations of police torture, meaning that the practice of police torture may continue 
almost with impunity. In this way one could say that the police corruption causes future 
violations of the prohibition of torture. The fewer cases solved and tried on torture 
allegations against police officers, the easier this practice can continue – a practice which is 
even considered necessary by police officers to do their job. “Indeed, the problem of 
impunity for these violations [the prohibition of torture, summary and arbitrary killings, 
and enforced disappearances], a matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well 
be an important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations.”267 A UN report 
states that police violence is used to force confessions, to pressure witnesses, to discourage 
detainees to file a complaint against police, or to extort money. The ill-treatment of 
detainees is often facilitated by falsified entries in custody registers.268 According to 
several human rights organizations incidents of police torture are not at all rare,269 and it is 
even tolerated by society.270 Cases are difficult to bring to trial. The Nizhnii Novgorod 
Committee Against Torture has received 302 claims of torture, and only ten resulted in 
conviction.271
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There is also a causal link between corruption in the justice system and a general problem 
for human rights implementation since the effect of such corruption is to undermine the 
very foundation upon which human rights implementation rests: judicial independence and 
the rule of law. Judicial independence presupposes a corruption free judicial system, since 
the judiciary is neither impartial nor independent if rulings are swayed in one way or 
another. If there is no judicial independence then the rule of law does not prevail, and this 
creates problems for the implementation of human rights law. As stated by Mendelson and 
Gerber corruption in the police contributes to a lack of trust in both the law enforcement 
agencies and the judicial system. This is critical sine trust in the justice system is a crucial 
element for any rights protection.272 There may well be certain groups of people who are 
more vulnerable than others. Taking the example of ethnic minorities, Amnesty 
International reports that ethnically motivated violence and xenophobia is on the rise in 
Russia.273 Many of these victims do not trust the police for protection and do not report the 
incidents in fear of suffering further harassment. As a consequence they may suffer 
violations of non-discrimination provisions, since they do not, in practice, have the same 
protection as the rest of the Russian population.274 This indicates that police corruption is 
causally linked to lack of protection of minorities and violations of the prohibition of 
discrimination.275 Corruption in the justice system also perpetuates discrimination in 
general since it means unequal treatment, not based on objective or reasonable criteria.276  
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
The link between corruption in the Russian justice system and human rights violations is 
here conceptualized in a twofold manner. They may be conceptually related, where an act 
of corruption in and of itself turns out to be a violation of human rights. This means that the 
                                                 
272 See chapter 3.1 
273 See press release Russian Federation: Racism and xenophobia rife in Russian society (2006), the full 
report has not been possible to access.  
274 See chapter 2.2.1 on equality before the law, equal protection of the laws, and non-discrimination by way 
of law. 
275 Protection against violence committed against civilians may possibly also be covered by the right to 
privacy. 
276 Jayawickrama (1998) 
 58
two are internally linked. One example is the practice of arbitrary detention as part of the 
extortion practice. This act constitutes a violation of the right to liberty and security of 
person. The second type of link is an external link which is causal. This means that 
corruption causes human rights violations. Here an example would be that corruption 
undermines fundamental preconditions for human rights implementation. 
 
Obviously, the there may well be other reasons for low confidence in the justice system and 
for the erosion of the rule of law besides corruption. There are certainly several other 
factors contributing to a difficult climate for human rights observance in Russia. One of 
these is already mentioned, namely the negative myth of the rule of law. The example in 
chapter 4.2.1.4 demonstrates that administrative procedures may create opportunities for 
corruption. In relation to the violation of the prohibition of discrimination of the right to 
education, the system of residence registration is one factor which in particular contributes 
to the human rights violation. Officially the Soviet propiska system of registration is 
abolished, but in some places a similar practice still remains in place and constitutes an 
obstacle to equal access to public goods such as education.277 One way of assuring rights 
protection is to eliminate all such procedural obstacles. This may be true regarding the 
propiska system, especially since it is also considered problematic regarding the right to 
freedom of movement.278 Looking at it from a more general perspective, though, the 
problem which must be addressed is the culture of corruption, since not all such 
administrative procedures are possible or even desirable to abolish. 
 
The next chapter will present two cases where the main focus will be on the internal link 
between corruption and human rights violations, mainly in relation to fair trial provisions 
and the right to a remedy. It will, however, also shed some light on the causal effect of 
corruption on violations of the prohibition of torture, and on the negative effect on public 
perception of the judicial system contributing to the erosion of the rule of law.  
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5 Case studies 
This chapter introduces the two case studies and analyse them in a human rights 
perspective. The first is the case of Aleksey Mikheyev, who, as a victim of petty corruption 
in the police, suffered a violation of the right to a remedy. The second case is the case of 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who is a victim of grand corruption in the judiciary and possibly of 
violations of the right to a fair trial. 
 
5.1 Aleksey Mikheyev 
5.1.1 The case 
The case of Aleksey Mikheyev is the first case from the ECtHR where the Russian 
Federation has been found guilty of police torture.279 The judgement is quite recent and fell 
on January 26th 2006.280 This case shows signs of the classic corrupt behaviour of police 
officers who are faced with torture allegations, using their informal networks resorting to 
intimidation and improper investigation. 
 
Mikheyev and a friend were arrested by the police 10 September 1998 after a mother 
informed the police that her daughter was disappeared. The two men gave the girl a lift to 
Nizhniy Novgorod on 8 September, but claimed they had nothing to do with her 
disappearance.281 None of them were charged, but they were still detained. On 12 
September three officers from Bogorodsk municipal police filed an “administrative offence 
report” with a judge of Bogorodsk Town Court. The report stated that on the evening of 
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11 September Mikheyev and his friend had committed a “disturbance of the peace” at the 
railway station. 
 
While detained Mikheyev was repeatedly questioned about the girl. On 16 September the 
police opened a criminal investigation related to ammunition found in Mikheyev’s car, and 
he was moved to a detention centre of the Leninskiy police department. The treatment 
deteriorated and Mikheyev was threatened with torture and electric shock treatment if he 
did not admit to the murder of the missing girl. 
 
At this point, Mikheyev’s friend had testified that he had seen Mikheyev rape and kill the 
girl, and gave the police a location where the body was supposedly hidden. The police 
found nothing when they search the place. Mikheyev was tortured at the presence of 
several police officers. While handcuffed to his chair he was treated with electric shocks to 
his earlobes, and he was threatened with severe beating and application of electric shocks 
to his genitals.282 Mikheyev reported the ill-treatment to the deputy regional prosecutor, but 
he did not react. He was not present in the room at the time of the torture, but he did 
question Mikheyev after the ill-treatment. He also ordered the police officers to take 
Mikheyev “back to where he came from,” when Mikheyev refused to confess the murder. 
 
On 19 September Mikheyev jumped out of the window to commit suicide as a result of the 
pain he suffered. He fell on a police motorcycle and broke his spine. Mikheyev was taken 
to hospital, but, even though his mother insisted, the doctors refused to include the burns on 
his ears in the medical record. On the day that Mikheyev jumped out of the window, the 
girl, who was allegedly raped and killed, returned home unharmed. She said she had been 
offered a ride by the two men, and had later stayed with a friend without letting her family 
know. On 25 September the criminal case concerning the alleged rape and murder of the 
missing girl was discontinued, but Mikheyev was then charged with abduction. This case 
was later closed on 1 March 2000. On 1 March 1999 the investigation into the illegal 
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possession of ammunition was discontinued since Mikheyev had been an officer in the road 
police at the time.  
 
The case of pre-trial investigation of the alleged torture of Mikheyev was closed and 
reopened numerous times. The first two investigation rounds were conducted by the same 
investigator, and when a new was appointed, he still based the discontinuation of the 
investigation on the same reasoning as made when the investigation was closed the first 
time, on 21 December 1998. In these reports, the only witness who confirmed to have seen 
burns on Mikheyev’s ears was another patient at the hospital. He was an electrician so he 
knew what such burns would look like. His testimony was still rejected because he had “no 
specialist medical knowledge.”283 In November 2000 the case was reopened by another 
supervising prosecutor, and this time Mikheyev’s friend testified that he had been 
threatened with torture if he did not confess. The officer who threatened him was the same 
prosecutor who had questioned Mikheyev after he had been tortured. Mikheyev’s friend 
told the officer in charge of the investigation about this, but it was not included in the 
official records. 
 
During these rounds of investigations the Nizhegorodskiy District Court of Nizhniy 
Novgorod once quashed a decision to discontinue the investigation. They claimed that 
Mikheyev’s submissions were detailed and consistent and that the case should be 
investigated more thoroughly. As a result the investigation was reopened, and later, once 
again, closed. On 2 December 1998 the President of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court 
also noted that the report on Mikheyev’s arrest relating to “disturbance of the peace” was 
incorrect since he had been in police detention at that time.284
 
Mikheyev’s mother stated that the doctors refused to include remarks of burns on 
Mikheyev’s ears because “they had been given instructions to that effect.”285 Another, 
more objective reason for suspicion is the fact that the case was opened and closed 
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repeatedly; it was opened for the 24th time after the ECtHR decided to hear the case.286 
This indicates that someone within the group of officers conducting the investigation had 
an interest in obstruct the case investigation. After finally confessing to the murder, the 
police wanted Mikheyev to confess to at least five other murders as well.287 Mikheyev was 
also threatened and told he would die in a fake apartment robbery if he did not drop the 
case.288  
 
Claims of ill-treatment made by both Mikheyev and his friend to the investigating officers 
were never included in the official documensts. Mikheyev’s friend told the regional NGO, 
Nizhniy Novgorod Committee against Torture, that he had seen bruises on Mikheyev’s 
neck when they had met for a short time 18 September. 
 
Medical examination of Mikheyev was carried out only on 26 October 1998, and only a 
few of the patients and personnel at the hospital were identified and questioned 
immediately after the case was opened the first time. Other patients and personnel were 
only included in the investigation in January 2000, after numerous complaints by Mikheyev 
and his representatives. In August 2002 Mikheyev requested the prosecution to question 
another patient, but on 5 September 2002 the case was discontinued because, inter alia, that 
it had been impossible to find this person. As it turns out, the officer who was supposed to 
question him was one of the officers under investigation. The former patient had been 
contacted by the police who said they would come to question him, but the investigator 
never showed up. The fact that an officer under investigation actually was involved in the 
investigation himself obviously gives him an opportunity to influence the process of 
investigation. He had an interest in the case not reaching the trial stage, and used the 
opportunity to avoid questioning a witness. This witness was earlier questioned by the 
Nizhniy Novgorod Committee against Torture, and stated that he had seen marks on 
Mikheyev’s ears.289  
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 The ECtHR states that one reason for the lack of independence of the investigation is the 
dual responsibility of the State prosecutors’ offices for prosecution and proper conduct of 
investigation. In this case, the prosecution official, who had supervised the questioning of 
the applicant on 19 September 1998, performed the role of Nizhniy Novgorod deputy 
regional prosecutor.290 Such a dual role impairs the independence of an investigation, but 
cannot be blamed for all the investigative irregularities in this case.  
 
The fact that police officers go to such lengths as to create reports claiming that Mikheyev 
was responsible for disturbances while he was actually in police custody at least shows that 
the police is willing to go far to solve crimes – or in this case, solve a crime which was 
never committed. Three police officers were prosecuted for making false statements, but 
the charges were dropped because of a “change in circumstances” since one of the officers 
had been dismissed from his job, and the other two had been transferred to other positions 
within the Ministry of the Interior. This case was also reopened and closed several times, 
and the proceedings were still pending in January 2006.291
 
5.1.2 The Mikheyev case as a case of corruption 
Relating this case to figure 4.1, the malpractice starts with the torture of Mikheyev, 
constituting a violation of the prohibition of torture. The reason for this violence seems that 
the police wanted Mikheyev to confess a murder. As ruled by the ECtHR there were 
committed a series of acts which lead to a violation of the right to a remedy. But the 
question remains as to whether these acts were acts of corruption. As in any case of 
corruption evidence is difficult to find, but relating the patterns found in this case to what is 
already mentioned about the Russian police, it seems likely that justice was obstructed as a 
manifestation of police corruption. It may be difficult to separate the use of informal 
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networks from simply sloppy police work since the result may be the same. It is, however, 
indicative of reliance on networks when such improper investigation is happening in cases 
where police officers themselves are under investigation or where they have a clear interest 
in the outcome of the investigation.  
 
The acts committed by the police officers are classic behaviour, part of a strategy to avoid 
investigation and prosecution of police torture. Remembering the necessity of performing 
their police duties “effectively” to be considered a well functioning police unit, and the 
need to protect and please superior officers to get the bonus salary, covering up police 
torture by abusing their powers may well be in the personal interest of a regular police 
officer. In the case of Mikheyev the police officers wanted him to confess not just the 
murder of the girl he had given a lift, but also several other murders, where there seemingly 
was no connection between him and the victims. This shows that the police officers in 
question were eager to “solve crime.” The deputy regional prosecutor was also aware of the 
torture, but he did not react. This means that not only low level police officers are 
responsible for the torture, and by obstructing the justice they do not only have to protect 
themselves from prosecution but also the prosecutor and other senior officers participating 
in the questioning.292 Igor Kalypin, head of the Niznii Novgorod Committee Against 
Torture, confirms that there is a climate of impunity regarding police torture. He claims 
state officials avoid punishment because of their position.293 He also states that the police is 
a “self-contained entity” operating without transparency, and that the prosecutors normally 
side with the police.294
 
According to the deputy chairwoman of the same organization, Olga Sadovskaya, the 
investigator and the prosecutor’s offices deliberately dragged out the inquiries into the 
Mikheyev case.295 Kalypin agrees: “Prosecutors sabotage these cases.”296 This is 
confirmed by Mikheyev himself, who, after winning the case in the ECtHR, said he would 
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pursue the case further until all those responsible are punished. He made specific reference 
to the prosecutors who protected the ones guilty of torture by repeatedly closing the 
investigation.297
 
5.1.3 Human rights implications  
The ECtHR ruled a violation of article 3, freedom from torture, and 13, the right to a 
remedy.298 In cases like this one, where police officers in different ways obstruct 
investigation of alleged torture, their practice firstly, like determined by the ECtHR, violate 
the right to a remedy. According to the ECtHR a number of the investigative measures 
were taken very belatedly and there was no doubt that there was a connection between the 
officials responsible for the investigation and those allegedly involved in the ill-treatment. 
The Court also noted that the case did not reach the trial stage until seven years after the 
alleged torture. The corrupt practice, reliance on informal networks conducting improper 
investigation, constituted a violation of the right to a remedy.  
 
Corruption also facilitates a continued practice of police torture. In cases where the practice 
of obstruction succeeds, the torture victim may never have his case tried, and no violation 
will be found, neither of the right to a remedy, nor of the right to freedom from torture. The 
more widely informal networks within the police are used to obstruct investigation into 
human rights violations, the less secure these rights are. Hence, corruption is not only 
violating the right to a remedy, but is also facilitating a continued practice of other human 
rights violations since the police officers, because of their informal networks, can continue 
their practice basically with impunity. The case of Mikheyev is, as mentioned earlier, the 
first case where the ECtHR has ruled that the Russian police has engaged in torture. The 
prohibition of torture is one right were widespread corruption in the police creates systemic 
problems in securing it. Obviously, other human rights may suffer the same destiny if 
police officers there too rely on informal networks to obstruct investigation into violations. 
                                                 
297 Osborn, Independent (31 January 2006) 
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 5.2 Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
In this section the focus will be on the trial and conviction of former CEO of Yukos, 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Several others from the same company are also convicted or have 
recently faced charges, but for the sake of clarity, the scope here is limited to 
Khodorkovsky. The cases are also considered separate criminal cases within the Russian 
judicial system. The matter of guilt as to the charges is not of primary interest, and will not 
be discussed. 
 
5.2.1 The case 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky was one of several Russians who, during the time of privatization, 
were able to get control over a large portion of Russian industry, over a hundred companies 
in all.299 He invested in timber, titanium and copper smelting, but soon decided to invest in 
the oil industry. The price of these companies was way below market price; the oil 
company Gazprom was sold for less than one-thousandth of the value put on it by foreign 
investment banks.300 What happened during these years of privatization happened in a 
“vacuum without effective laws” in a weakened state.301 “Lying, stealing, and cheating 
were part of daily business, and violence, brutality, and coercion were often tools of the 
trade.”302 The question remains how to define the past activity of today’s oligarchs. Was it 
lawful or was it criminal? That is, however, not really the issue at stake here, still it is 
important to remember the background of Khodorkovsky’s industrial empire.303
 
                                                 
299 Hoffman (2002), p. 205 
300 ibid., p. 205 
301 ibid., p. 6 
302 ibid., p. 6 
303 Some observers claim that the charges brought against Khodorkovsky are both well-based and credible, 
and that the defence essentially rests on the idea that the large scale corruption of the 1990s should be 
legitimized. See Lieven, International Herald Tribune (10 June 2005) 
 67
Khodorkovsky was arrested on October 25 2003 by armed FSB agents. He was charged 
and prosecuted with fraud and tax evasion. On May 31 he received a nine year sentence of 
imprisonment.   
 
5.2.2 The Khodorkovsky case as a case of corruption 
When discussing the case of Khodorkovsky the case of Vladimir Gusinksiy, the former 
majority shareholder in ZAO Media Most, a private Russian media holding company, 
comes to mind. He won his case in the ECtHR, claiming a violation of article 5. He 
claimed that he was detained because the government wanted to sell his media assets.304 
Gusinskiy and Khodorkovsky both were controlling large commercial interests the 
authorities wanted to control, and Yukos filed a bankruptcy protection in a U.S. court to 
prevent the Russian government from selling assets.  
 
Many see the prosecution of Khodorkovsky as economically motivated, while other critics 
say it is politically motivated since Khodorkovsky was politically active, openly supporting 
the opposition parties,305 organizations and media critical to the Putin administration.306 
The Council of Europe rapporteur on the Yukos case, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, 
concludes in her report that “the presence of an interest of the State that exceeds its normal 
interest in criminal justice being done and includes such elements as: to weaken an 
outspoken political opponent, to intimidate other wealthy individuals, and to regain control 
over “strategic” economic assets – can hardly be denied.”307 “[The arrest and prosecution 
of Yukos executives is] a clear case of non-conformity with the rule of law and […] these 
executives were – in violation of the principle of equality before the law – arbitrarily 
singled out by the authorities.”308 The claim is supported by various human rights 
organizations like the Freedom House stating that “Khodorkovsky and his associates were 
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305 Moskalenko, The Wall Street Journal (16 December 2004) 
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singled out by the Russian authorities as soon as they expressed concern with an increasing 
authoritarian government.” Freedom House also states that many other business leaders 
could be charged with the same crimes, but those who are prosecuted are those who 
challenge the regime.309 The timing of these cases also seems connected to the Kremlin’s 
political agenda, since most of the crimes are committed years ago and could have been 
investigated much earlier.310  
 
When he came to power Putin made a tacit agreement with the oligarchs; if they stay out of 
politics the state administration would stay out of their business. Several observers of the 
case think Khodorkovsky violated this agreement by seeking political power.311 As a 
consequence Putin manipulated the corrupt political and legal systems to silence 
Khodorkovsky.312 Robert Amsterdam, defence attorney for Khodorkovsky, claims that the 
state’s motive for prosecution is twofold: “to eliminate Mr. Khodorkovsky as a political 
opponent, and to eliminate Yukos as a competitor to state-owned energy companies.”313 
Making such a tacit agreement with certain business interests which would give them 
preferential status and treatment would constitute grand corruption. Initiating a criminal 
prosecution as a punishment for breaking the agreement means to initiate a process of 
selective application of the law to secure power and status or other personal interests. This 
would be an example of grand corruption.314 Regarding the economic motive, on 
December 19 2004 Yukos’ main production unit, Yuganskneftegaz, was auctioned off by 
the Russian government.315
 
According to Taras Kuzio there is a close relationship between “the deterioration of 
democratization in the CIS, creation of hybrid regimes by elites who have “captured” the 
state, and corruption.”316 Kuzio also claims that the prosecution of Khodorkovsky is not 
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part of an anti-corruption campaign, rather selective enforcement of the law which is a 
phenomenon applied throughout CIS states. 
 
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger presents two main groups of explanations of the 
Khodorkovsky case. The first is that this is only the beginning of a campaign to reassert the 
authority of the State and to enforce one legal standard for all. Any procedural violations 
are committed by sheer incompetence. The second explanation is that this is part of a long 
term strategy to centralize power in Kremlin. It started with the prosecution of Gusinskiy 
and the takeover of NTV to warn all media companies, making actual censorship 
unnecessary. The next step is attacking the oligarchs who have advanced transparency in 
business and who have funded civil society groups and opposition parties. The final step 
would be an attack on the independence of civil society organizations. This was only 
predicted in 2004, but has actually been introduced since then. On January 10 Putin signed 
legislation introducing new restrictions on NGOs, expanding the grounds for closing or 
denying their registration.317 In the name of national interest and security it opens for 
government investigation of organizations, and it imposes restrictions on foreign funding 
and having foreigners working in the offices.318 The Federal Registration Service already 
claims the dissolution of Russia’s Human Rights Center.319
 
According to Katarina Moskalenko, one of Khodorkhovsky’s lawyers, the General 
Prosecutor’s office and the courts are subject to manipulation by the government. They are 
“instruments to intimidate and subdue critics of the state.”320 According to her one judge 
has been removed from the Yukos tax case because a failure to conduct the trial as 
expected by political superiors.321 Hearings are kept in small court rooms to keep media 
out, and the main national television media are all controlled by the State, preventing 
independent media coverage. Moskalenko also points to several procedural errors under the 
investigation. Robert Amsterdam, another Yukos lawyer, was visited in his hotel room by 
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five men and had his visa revoked. The Interior Ministry denies involvement, so does the 
FSB.322 Amsterdam has been publicizing the Yukos case in the West and is expected to 
play a leading role in any appeal to the ECtHR.  
 
The court’s reasoning in the judgement is almost identical with the pleadings of the 
prosecution, and the judgement undermines trust in Russia and shows a lack of legal 
certainty.323 Khodorkovsky was denied bail, which could be another sign of excessive 
government interest in the case since persons accused of economic crimes are generally not 
placed in pre-trial detention.324
 
“The manner of his arrest, the length of his jailing and the assigning of the case to a court 
that is well-known in Russian legal circles for its slavish obedience to the will of the state 
prosecutor are indicative of the corruption of democratic institutions and processes under 
President Putin.”325
 
5.2.3 Human rights implications 
“The trial against the former leading executives of Yukos, the oil company that is 
meanwhile almost totally dismantled, was won by the enemies of the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary.”326 Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger points to numerous 
procedural shortcomings and that the judgement is revenge for political opposition. In her 
final report, Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger points to a possible violation of the right to 
liberty and security of person, when denying bail, referring to the case of Letellier v. 
France. She also raises issues of concern relating to article 6 ECHR, the right to a fair trial. 
The lawyers had difficulties getting the “permission” from the prosecutor’s office to access 
the clients in the pre-trial detention facilities. According to the prosecutors such 
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“permissions” are no longer needed, but a “supportive letter” to facilitate access is common 
practice. The gap between law and practice makes the lawyer’s job more difficult, and the 
difficulties vary with the sensitivity of the case. On several occasions there has also been a 
breach of the lawyer-client privilege, which is protected under the right to a fair trial. The 
office of lawyer Anton Drel was searched and documents were seized.327 Confidential 
papers have also been confiscated when lawyers have visited pre-trial detention facilities. 
Lawyers also suspect that their conversations are taped and listened to by the authorities. 
The defence also claims that there has been an unfair limitation of the time for their clients 
to familiarize themselves with the files.328 All this may raise issues under ECHR article 
6.3.b, relating to the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare for the defence.  
 
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger also claims that most pre-trial hearings were held in camera. 
When open, the court rooms were small, and most seats already taken by men in uniform. 
Some journalists were denied entry and the procedure to enter the court room was 
inconvenient. This may raise concerns in relation to ECHR article 6.1 and the right to a 
public hearing. As stated in chapter 2.2.5, a hearing should only be closed under special 
circumstances and the right to a public hearing exists as a guarantee against arbitrary 
decisions. 
 
The prosecutor was systemically allowed to read out the minutes of the pre-trial 
interrogation of witnesses. Then the prosecutor spent time in the court room, pressuring the 
witnesses to confirm those minutes almost phrase by phrase. This undermines the 
effectiveness of the right of the defence to question the witnesses of the prosecution and 
raises concern about the principle of equality of arms, inherent in the right to a fair trial.329
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If the law is applied selectively to Khodorkovsky, as is claimed by human rights 
organizations, the Council of Europe and even British courts,330 this would constitute a 
violation of non-discrimination provisions which provide for equality of all before the 
law.331
 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has served as a more thorough investigation into the human rights 
consequences of corruption in the Russian justice system, illustrating the consequences 
mainly at the individual level. The case of Mikheyev illustrates police officers’ reliance on 
informal networks when faced with allegations of torture. They resort to corrupt practices 
like improper medical examination of the torture victim and belated and improper 
investigation in general. The officers are willing to exceed their powers to avoid criminal 
charges for themselves or colleagues. They are also willing to continue a practice of police 
violence to solve crimes (and protect this practice with corruption) which increases the 
likelihood of getting bonus payments. The ECtHR ruled a violation of the right to a remedy 
as a result of improper police investigation.  
 
The case of Khodorkovsky is an example of how grand corruption is played out in a court 
of law. The Council of Europe rapporteur on the Yukos case observes possible violations of 
both the right to a fair trial and right to liberty and security of person. She does, however, 
clearly state that she does not proclaim a final judgement since she does not want to 
prejudge any future findings of the ECtHR.332 Some observers have commented how this 
case has been a litmus test on the Russian judicial system – which ultimately failed.333
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6 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have investigating the relationship between corruption in the Russian justice 
system and human rights implementation. The findings confirmed my main hypothesis: 
corruption in the Russian justice system increases human rights abuses. Corruption and 
human rights are here linked in two ways: conceptually or causally. 
 
The conceptual link means that corruption behaviour may be internally linked to human 
rights violations, constituting violations of human rights law in and of itself. Rights 
affected are the right to liberty and security of person, the right to privacy, the right to a fair 
trial, prohibition of discrimination, and the right to a remedy. Causally, corruption may 
infringe the prohibition of discrimination and the prohibition of torture. Corruption in the 
justice system leads to erosion of the rule of law and violations of judicial independence, 
undermining fundamental preconditions for any human rights implementation. The case 
studies exemplify human rights consequences of corruption, demonstrating the effects of 
petty corruption and grand corruption, in the police and judiciary, respectively. The case of 
Mikheyev illustrates the informal networks as a means to perform corrupt acts, which in the 
Russian police contributes to a climate of impunity, creating possibilities for further human 
rights violations. The case of Khodorkovsky demonstrates the government’s willingness 
and ability to interfere in a court of law, selectively applying laws, and violating fair trial 
provisions. 
 
These preliminary findings are considerable enough to justify further research. The causal 
effect should be further analysed controlling for the effects of other factors, relying on 
other types of research methodology. What has been firmly established in this thesis is that 
certain acts of a corruption are themselves violations of human rights. This means that 
human rights violations in the Russian Federation cannot only be addressed as such. 
Human rights awareness should go hand in hand with anti-corruption initiatives. 
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This thesis clearly demonstrates the need for the Russian Federation to implement effective 
anti-corruption strategies to honour its human rights obligations. What types of counter-
measures which should be implemented is left to others to decide, but they must provide 
security against human rights violations. They must adequately be provided with 
democratic checks and balances, to avoid politicization of the anti-corruption strategy.334 
This is already a problem in Russia and other CIS states where anti-corruption campaigns 
sometimes are used as political tools to root out opposition.335 According to Kumar this can 
be avoided by recognizing corruption as a human rights issue since it “broadens the scope 
for engagement and political consensus can be developed to ensure that such a violation of 
human rights is uniformly recognized without any form of discrimination.”336
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